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UNDERMINING INALIENABLE RIGHTS:

From

Dred Scott to the Rehnquist Court
Alexander Tsesist

1.

INTRODUCTION

This 1 5 0 th anniversary of the Dred Scott' decision presents the
opportunity to assess whether the Supreme Court continues to rely on
notions of states' rights doctrine to thwart civil rights initiatives.
Particularly suspect are recent findings that Congress abused its Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 5 authority in passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,2 the Violence Against Women Act,3 and parts of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")4 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA").5 While those decisions by no means treat
victims as sub-humans, in the way that Dred Scott did blacks, they display a
knee jerk rejection against federal efforts to protect individual rights for the
common good.
Chief Justice Taney's majority opinion in Dred Scott denied both the
validity of black citizenship and the congressional authority to prohibit state

sanctioned forms of racial discrimination.6 The Reconstruction
Amendments overturned Taney's racialized notion of national citizenship.7
After 1866, with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act, the federal government received the
unambiguous authority to protect citizens' rights in areas of law that had
t
Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University, Chicago, School of Law. I received
invaluable comments on an earlier draft from Scott Moss, Mark Graber, Richard L. Aynes, and
Alan Raphael. I am also grateful to Gordon Hylton for offering encyclopedic advice on portions
of this article. I also benefited from comments at a Loyola University School of Law faculty
presentation, especially those of Gregory Shaffer, Spencer Weber Waller, Brett M. Frischmann,
Jerry E. Norton, and John M. Breen. Parts of this article were presented and critiqued at the
Washington University School of Law, St. Louis conference on Dred Scott. See
http://artsci.wusti.edu/-acsp/dred.scott/video.php.
I.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
2.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
3.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
4.
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
5.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
6.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404, 426.
7.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV.
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been reserved to states, such as contract and real estate transactions. The
Fourteenth Amendment further clarified that each citizen had an equal stake
in privileges and immunities that no state actor could infringe.9 The
enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
provided Congress with the authority to pass civil rights laws for protecting
the universally shared interests of American citizens.' ° That new
constitutional departure was meant to prevent the Supreme Court from
undermining nationally applicable anti-discrimination measures." After the
Compromise of 1877, when President Rutherford B. Hayes withdrew
federal troops from the South and Reconstruction came to a screeching
halt,' 2 the Court challenged the Amendments' reduction of its authority in a
series of cases, most prominently the Slaughter-House3 and Civil Rights
Cases.'4 Those decisions and the legislative abandonment of the
Reconstruction agenda to protect universal rights wrenched power back to
the judiciary for defining what liberties are constitutionally protected.
Congress was relegated to a secondary role in the definition of rights.
During the New Deal, the Court became more deferential to federal
efforts to administer economic programs with civil rights provisions.15 It
also established a heightened scrutiny standard for assessing the
constitutionality of state actions that targeted insular groups.6 Thereafter,
Japanese Internment showed that the Court had not fully comprehended its
role as the protector of minority rights. 7 It was, furthermore, unwilling to
disturb the post-Reconstruction rulings that had diminished congressional
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment authority.' 8 Thus, when legislators
returned to the task of civil rights protections and enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the statute's legitimacy was upheld on Commerce Clause
8.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000) ("[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State . .. to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens."); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (upholding
Congress's power to prevent private housing discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (Privileges and Immunities Clause).
9.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
11. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Popular ConstitutionalismVersus Justice in Plainclothes:
Reflections from History, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1429-30 (2005).
12. See Alexander Tsesis, FurtheringAmerican Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 329 n.102 (2004).
13. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
14. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, WE SHALL OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE
LAW (forthcoming 2008).
16. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
17. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18.

ALEXANDER TSESIs, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 82

(2004).
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grounds, not the civil rights grounds foreclosed by the Court's postReconstruction jurisprudence.19
The trend shifted in the direction of Taney's narrow vision of federal
authority over national citizenship in a series of decisions limiting
congressional ability to regulate state employment discrimination. Finding
Congress overstepped the scope of its authority when it passed statutes that
held states accountable for disability discrimination (under the ADA)2 ° and
age discrimination (under the ADEA),2 the Court elevated state sovereignty
ahead of national standards for workplace equality. The Court was not,
however, willing to entirely disturb the New Deal's federal orientation on
civil rights statutes, as it upheld the applicability to the states of the Family
Medical Leave Act22 and a section of the ADA that dealt with access to
courts .23

This Article evaluates the extent to which congressional authority under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which were designed to
overrule Dred Scott, extends to the protection of inalienable rights. The
second part reflects on the universal rights Revolutionaries claimed were at
the core of nationhood. That part also examines how the pragmatic,
constitutional compromises they made for the sake of union sullied their
achievements. The third part examines the extent to which Dred Scott
distanced itself from the protection of universal rights that transcend state
sovereignty. Part four discusses the reconstruction of the American
conception of citizenship through both constitutional amendment and
legislative initiatives. That section further considers how the Supreme Court
undermined changes to the Constitution, gravitating back to the antebellum
primacy of state authority over universally recognized rights. Part five
discusses post-Reconstruction judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part six then delves into some recent limitations on federal
civil rights authority, which the Rehnquist Court predicated on state
sovereignty, swinging the pendulum away from the Warren Court deference
to legislative efforts on behalf of civil rights back to the Taney Court's
narrow construction of federal powers.

19. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
20. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
21. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
22. Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735-36 (2003).
23. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).
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REVOLUTIONARY NOTIONS OF INALIENABLE RIGHTS

One of the most commonly recognized errors of Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott was his claim that blacks were not citizens anywhere
in the early republic.24 Justice Curtis, in his dissent, was the first to point out
that Taney's claim was not historically accurate.25 Not only was he wrong
because blacks had been citizens in several states at the time of the
Constitution's ratification,26 but also because a common strand of thought in
the Revolutionary Period was the universality of inalienable rights that were
not predicated on race.
Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence relied on political
rhetoric that had been widely disseminated in the colonies through a variety
of pamphlets and treatises. His statement of the "self-evident" truth that "all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness" distilled philosophical and political thought of his day.27 While
the Declaration provides the best known formulation of the Revolution's
civil ights foundation, it was by no means a radical statement. Jefferson
relied on the contemporary understanding of what rights all people shared.
In separate letters, Richard Henry Lee and John Adams drew attention to
the Declaration's lack of originality. Jefferson, in turn, responded that he
meant for it to reflect the enervating spirit of the times. 28 Lee, a delegate to
the first Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration, claimed that
Jefferson "copied from Locke's treatise on government., 29 Adams, who was
one of the most powerful figures of the Continental Congress and the
second president of the United States, wrote to Timothy Pickering with
irritation that there "is not an idea in it but what had been hackneyed in
Congress for two years before." 3 John Locke figured prominently in the
pantheon of philosophers whose ideas influenced republican ideals. He
24. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-04,407-08 (1856).
25. Id. at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting) ("At the time of the ratification of the Articles of
Confederation, all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not
only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications
possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citizens."); Stuart A. Streichler,
Justice Curtis's Dissent in the Dred Scott Case: An Interpretive Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 509, 510 (1997).
26.

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting).

27.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3 JAMES MORTON SMITH, THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS 1826

28.

(1995) (quoting a letter

from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1823)).
29. Id.
30. 2 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 514 (1850) (quoting a
letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering (Aug. 22, 1822)).
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insisted that persons "by nature, [are] all free, equal, and independent."3
Jefferson did not dispute Lee's and Adams's assertions, to the contrary he
responded that he had not aimed "to find out new principles, . . . to say
things that had never been said before, but to place before mankind the
common sense of the subject" that reflected the "sentiments of the day,
whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the

elementary books of public right. 32
Jefferson's accomplishment lay in rendering the readily recognizable
commitment to the protection of individual rights in an elegant style that
appealed to his own and future generations. In a somewhat less eloquent
manner, Stephen Johnson, Pastor of the First Church of Christ in Lyme,
asserted the same commitment as Jefferson:
Important are the rights of mankind, to the safe and unmolested
enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and to the best
improvement of all their powers, with every reasonable and
equitable advantage they have to promote their present and
everlasting welfare. These natural rights, civil and religious, are
the gifts of God, as such sacred; nor may any but He, as original
proprietor, resume them at pleasure.33

Many other writers combined religious with secular political views in
support of the revolutionary cause. David Griffith, a Virginia Army
chaplain, asserted that God did not require any obedience to those "who
destroy, by their acts of power, the cause of truth and the happiness of
mankind."34 Three months before the colonists declared their independence
from Britain, Enoch Huntington, a pastor of the First Church of Christ, in
31.

JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL

GOVERNMENT 51 (Edes and Gill, 1773) (1690). On Locke's influence on the Constitution, see

201-03 (Da Capo Press 1974)
(1904); JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOUNDING ERA
209-11, 246-50 (1995); WILLARD S. RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON 205 (1993); MORTON
WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 61-78 (1978); Donald L. Doernberg,
"We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge
Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 64-66 (1985); Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-FederalistTale
of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 307-10 (1990). But see GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 172-75 (1978) (arguing
that Locke had little, if any, influence on writing the Declaration of Independence).
32. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 118 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
33. Stephen Johnson, Pastor of the First Church of Christ in Lyme, Election Sermon:
Integrity and Piety the Best Principles of a Good Administration of Government 5 (May 10,
1770).
34. Rev. David Griffith, Rector of Shelburne Parish, Virginia, Sermon: Passive Obedience
Considered 18 (Dec. 31, 1775).
HERBERT FRIEDENWALD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
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Middletown, relied on religion and reason, drawing attention to the
"justness of sentiment, zeal for liberty, and the unalienable rights of
mankind" for those who fought for the American cause. 35 The country's
likelihood of success, Huntington went on, was assured by the "fond parents
and relatives" who "part with their children and friends, and encourage and
spirit them to go forth in the defence and for the protection of our rights and
privileges. 36 Numerous authors of the period sought to flesh out the drive
for independence from colonial rule.
A survey of Revolutionary literature about inalienable rights and the
general welfare reveals their centrality to eighteenth century political
thought. In a 1788 pamphlet, Lee distinguished natural and inalienable
rights "of which even the people cannot deprive individuals: Some are
constitutional or fundamental; these cannot be altered or abolished by the
ordinary laws: but the people, by express acts, may alter or abolish them."3
The people, wrote Elbridge Gerry, a historian of the Revolution, entrusted
the government with the power to protect property.3 8 The right to own
property was one of the most commonly recognized rights intrinsic to the
nature of humanity.3 9 All persons had an inviolable right to honestly and
fairly acquire and to keep possessions.4 ° The Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776 likewise recognized that property is among the "natural, inherent and
inalienable rights, 41 which could only be taken away with the owner's
"consent, or that of his legal representatives." 42 The Declaration of Rights of
the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont affirmed that "all men are born
equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and
unalienable rights" like "possessing and protecting property., 43 The New
Hampshire Bill of Rights similarly asserted that "acquiring, possessing, and
protecting, property" were among the "natural, essential, and inherent
rights."'
35.
23 (Apr.
36.
37.

Enoch Huntington, The Happy Effects of Union, and the Fatal Tendency of Divisions
8, 1776).
Id. at 17.
RICHARD HENRY LEE, AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL

FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 51

(1788).

38.

ELBRIDGE GERRY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONVENTIONS 4 (1788).
39. See, e.g., MOSES MATHER, AMERICA'S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 7-9 (1775)

("By nature every man (under God) is his own legislator, judge, and avenger, and absolute lord
of his property.").
40. WILLIAM L. BROWN, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURAL EQUALITY OF MEN 81-82 (1802).
41. PA. CONST. of1776, art. I,§ 1.
42. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 8 (amended 1973).
43. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § 1.
44. N.H. CONST. pt. First, art. II.
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The right to own and sell property was by no means the only inalienable
interest of humanity. Even the right to a good reputation, because it is
essential to maintaining and improving one's social standing, was thought
to be inviolable from "unjust assault. 4 5 Many of those rights that colonists
believed were essential to human equality later made their way into the Bill
of Rights. Among these were the rights to free worship, political
representation, adequate notice of criminal charges, speedy trials, and
attorney representation.46 The right to travel, which the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 and the Vermont Constitution of 1777 listed, was only
nationally recognized in the mid-twentieth century.47
At the core of the American Revolution was the conviction that the
British had no authority to tax the colonists because they were
unrepresented in Parliament. The "power of self-government," wrote
Richard Price in a widely distributed work that was first published in48
February 1776, was the precise distinction "between liberty and slavery.,
At a 1773 anniversary commemoration of the Boston Massacre, Benjamin
Church invoked the "sacrifice of that liberty and that natural equality of
which we are all conscious., 49 The power of governance came from the
people, who share equally in decision-making through their elected
representatives. Governance by "[t]he consent of the people" is compatible

45. BROWN, supra note 40, at 78, 82-83.
46. See LEE, supra note 37, at 52-53.
47. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § XV; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § XVII. The lack of a
right to travel in the federal constitution enabled states to use statutes to prevent the poor and
persons with criminal records from emigrating there. See Mayor of N.Y. v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102, 133, 141 (1837). For contemporary cases recognizing the fundamental right to travel,
see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-04 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630
(1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126
(1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
48.

RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF
AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA 6 (1776).

GOVERNMENT,

OBSERVATIONS sold 60,000 copies and went through fourteen London editions in two months.
Carl B. Cone, Richard Price and the Constitution of the United States, 53 AM. HIST. REV. 726,
730 (1948). As a sign of its popularity in America, the pamphlet was issued in Philadelphia,
Boston, New York, and Charleston. Id.
49. Dr. Benjamin Church, An Oration; At the Request of the Inhabitants of the Town of
Boston; To Commemorate the Bloody Tragedy of the Fifth of March, 1770 (Mar. 5, 1773).
Church's speech was delivered to a packed meeting-house. 1 PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS, 17351784, at 143 (1962). Church later became the Chief Physician of the Continental Army. But in
1775, he was convicted for "communicating with the enemy." MARK MAYO BOATNER III,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 228-29 (1966); David James Kiracofe, Dr.
Benjamin Church and the Dilemma of Treason in Revolutionary Massachusetts, 70 NEW ENG.
Q. 443, 457-58 (1997).
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with the equal freedom to have proprietary rights.5" Staying true to this
principle of representational democracy, in the midst of Revolution,
Pennsylvania confirmed that "the community hath an indubitable,
unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish government."'"
The people's grant of power to the government was predicated on "that
natural freedom, to which all have an equal claim. ' 52 Civil government,
wrote Price, was compatible with "the natural equality of mankind."53 The
statement referred to mature individuals who could act as independent
4
agents for acquiring property.
Thus, an undeniable commitment to inalienable rights permeated early
American theory of government. A naturally free person exists before the
citizen, and the identical fundamental rights of personhood cannot be
abrogated by constitution or statute.
A. PracticalFailuresof Principles
Particularly disturbing is how many of the men who extolled liberty and
even denounced the contradiction between slavery and revolutionary ideals
were unreformed slave holders.5 5 The universal rights that underlay liberty
took a backseat to their material interests. At the age of twenty-five, when
he delivered his first speech in the Virginia House of Burgesses, Richard
Henry Lee advocated ending slave importation.5 6 He drew attention to how
importing slaves "has been, and will be attended with effects, dangerous

50. Samuel Stillman, Pastor of the First Baptist Church in Boston, and The Honorable
House of Representatives of the State of Massachussetts-Bay in New England, at Boston, A
Sermon Preached before the Honorable Council 8-9 (May 26, 1779).
51. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as established by the general
convention elected for that purpose, and held at Philadelphia, July 15th, 1776, and continued by
adjournments to September 28, 1776. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § V.
52. John Tucker, Pastor of the First Church in Newbury, A sermon preached at
Cambridge, before His Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, Esq.; Governor, His Honor Andrew
Oliver Esq.; Lieutenant-Governor, The Honorable His Majesty's Council, and House of
Representatives, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 13-14 (May 29,
1771).
53. RICHARD PRICE, ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF CIVIL
LIBERTY, AND THE WAR WITH AMERICA 11 (1778).
54. Id.atlO-11.
55. See Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach:Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism
Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1779-83 (2006) (evaluating
revolutionary writings on political slavery).
56. American Philosophical Society, Richard Henry Lee Papers, Background Note,
http://www.amphilsoc.org/library/mole/1/lee.pdf.
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both to our political and moral interests."57 He seemed to condemn the
institution of slavery, going so far as to say that persons imported into the
colonies should be "considered as created in the image of God as well as
ourselves, and equally entitled to liberty and freedom by the great law of
nature. 58 He also supported the Northwest Ordinance, which included a
clause against the spread of slavery into the Northwest Territory, which
encompassed present-day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and
Wisconsin.5 9 In the end, despite his sensibility, Lee did not change his
behavior, and at one point in his life even tried to join with others to make
money by selling slaves. 60 He died owning thirty-seven slaves, whom he did
not free but instead left as property to his heirs. 6'
Some of the Upper South's opposition to the Importation Clause was
driven not by antislavery sentiments but the desire to increase the value of
domestic slaves. In opposing ratification of the Constitution, George Mason
argued that slave importation was "infamous" and "detestable., 62 He
lectured fellow Virginians that Great Britain's support for it "was one of the
great causes of our separation.
Augmenting "slaves weakens the states;
and such a trade is diabolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind."'
Mason's aversion to treating persons as chattel, regrettably, went no further
than importation. He owned about 300 slaves himself and was upset that the65
Constitution did not secure "the property of the slaves we have already.,
Connecticut delegate Oliver Ellsworth and other contemporaries, claimed
Mason's opposition was based on his interest in maintaining high prices for
domestically sold slaves, which the importation of Africans was likely to
depress.66
Patrick Henry came face to face with his own hypocrisy after
scrutinizing one of Quaker Anthony Benezet's abolitionist tracts:
57. OLIVER P. CHITWOOD, RICHARD HENRY LEE: STATESMAN OF THE REVOLUTION 18
(1967) (quoting 1 RICHARD HENRY LEE, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF RICHARD HENRY LEE AND His
CORRESPONDENCE 17-19 (1825)).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 452 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 453; Howard A. Ohline, Republicanism and Slavery: Origins of the Three-Fifths
Clause in the United States Constitution,28 WM. & MARY Q. 563, 578 (1971).
66. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION WEDNESDAY,
AUGUST 21, 1787, at 503 (1987); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 364,
370 (Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1966); Oliver Ellsworth,'Landholder,' VI, CONN. COURANT,
Dec. 10, 1787.
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Is it not amazing, that at a time when the rights of Humanity

are defined & understood with precision in a Country above all
others fond of Liberty: that ...we find Men, professing a Religion

the most humane, mild, meek, gentle & generous, adopting a
Principle as repugnant to humanity ....Would any one believe

that I am Master of Slaves of my own purchase! I am drawn along
by ye general Inconvenience of living without them; I will not, I
cannot justify it. .

.

. I believe a time will come when an

oppertunity [sic] will be offered to abolish this lamentable Evil.67
Little could Henry know that the "lamentable Evil" would only be
abolished after a bloody civil war. Thomas Jefferson also realized the
incongruity of slavery with the Age of Revolution. Jefferson, indeed, had
some premonition about the national catastrophe that 68
slavery could
morals.
people's
the
destroying
was
it
that
believing
catalyze,
With the passage of time, Jefferson grew increasingly indifferent about
the plight of slaves. His changed attitude was indicative of the country's
shift from liberal ideals. Writing during the heyday of American
expectations, Jefferson had wanted to end the importation of slaves into the
colonies and follow up with the "abolition of domestic slavery., 69 In 1776,
the same year his draft Declaration of Independence proposed to condemn
King George for the slave trade,7° Jefferson's second and third drafts of the
Virginia Constitution contained a provision that, "No person hereafter
coming into this country shall be held in slavery under any pretext
whatever."'" Neither passed, but they appear to be indicative of how
disdainful of slavery he had been as a young man. But Jefferson, like his
fellow slaveholder George Mason, kept slaves during and after the
Revolution, even
though he admitted that "every master of slaves is born a
72
tyrant.,
petty
67.

Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), in GEORGE S.

FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET 443-44 (1937).
68. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

162-63

BROOKES,

(University of

N. C.

Chapel Hill Press 1955) (1787). On Jefferson's paltry condemnation of slavery, see DAVID B.
DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, at 164-84 (1975);
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 15501812, at 430-36 (1968); DUNCAN J. MACLEOD, SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION

69.

126-29 (1974).

THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA

16-17

ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM

12-13

(1774).
70.

(2004).
71.

1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 353, 363 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).

72.

2

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787,

1911) (statement of Col. George Mason).
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Opponents of the Constitution criticized this lack of integrity to
principle. John Mein, a British Loyalist, pointed out the disingenuousness of
Bostonians who grounded their struggle in the "immutable laws of nature,"
while they lived in a town where two thousand out of its fifteen thousand
inhabitants were black slaves.7 3 Samuel Johnson, the great English
lexicographer and opponent of colonial independence, mocked the "drivers
of Negroes" for their pretentious "yelps for liberty."74
With the passage of time, Jefferson became increasingly complacent
with the institution of slavery. In an 1814 letter, Jefferson counseled
Edward Coles, a soon-to-be antislavery governor of Illinois, against
manumitting his slaves.75 The degeneration from idealism to cold
resignation, complicity, and participation typified a political arrangement
willing to sacrifice the interests of slaves for creature comfort and domestic
tranquility. Later, it would be a comparable pragmatism to the plight of
individuals that moved Taney to degrade Dred Scott's claim to personal
liberty below his master's prerogative to his property.
After the Revolution, not everyone was as complacent as Jefferson,
Henry, and Lee. The most famous framer who acted on the ideals of
universal rights was former President George Washington who liberated his
slaves by will. He directed that elderly freed persons be paid pensions,
others be taught to read and write (even though Virginia laws prohibited
educating blacks), and any slaves who remained on his estate be paid for
76
their work.
General William Whipple, who served the nation during the Revolution
from Portsmouth, New Hampshire and was later a delegate to the
73.
74.

JOHN MEIN, SAGIITARIUS'S LE'TERS & POLITICAL SPECULATIONS

38-39 (1775).

PHILIP S. FONER, 1 HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS 303 (1975); see also A LETTER

FROM********, IN LONDON TO His FRIEND IN AMERICA ON THE SUBJECT OF THE SLAVE-TRADE

15-16 (1784).
75. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814) in 11 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 419 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905). Coles, who was one time secretary of
President James Madison and cousin of Dolly Madison, eventually set his own slaves free, but
only after calling Madison out about his hypocritical conscience on slavery. See RALPH
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 551-52 (1971); Paul Finkelman, The Dragon St.
George Could not Slay: Tucker's Plan to End Slavery, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1221
(2006) (describing Coles's manumission of his slaves).
76. ELI GINZBERG & ALFRED S. EICHNER, THE TROUBLESOME PRESENCE: AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY AND BLACK AMERICANS 45-46 (1964); EUGENE E. PRUSSING, THE ESTATE OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, DECEASED 27, 158-59 (1927); BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 187 (1961); 37 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 275-77 (John
C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931). Slavery was so imbedded in Virginia, however, that Washington's
nephew and estate executor, Bushrod Washington, who was then a Supreme Court Justice, only
carried out part of his uncle's will, selling some of the slaves. ELDER WlTr, CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 809 (2d ed. 1990).
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Continental Congress, likewise acted on the logic of natural rights. His
slave, Prince, had been in combat and was even an oarsman on George
Washington's boat as it made its way through the icy Delaware River
during a Christmas storm in 1776. 77 In 1777, Prince said to Whipple, "you
are going to fight for your liberty, but I have none to fight for." These words
cut Whipple to the quick, and he immediately freed him.7 8 Other great
personages of the day who provided slaves freedom by will were Senator
John Randolph 79 and Robert Carter 111.80 Randolph deplored the institution
of slavery, but even at the time of his death he had about 400 slaves.81
Carter gradually manumitted about 500 slaves.82 Some ordinary slave
holders were also moved by the enlightened rhetoric of the Revolution. One
study of Petersburg, Virginia found that between 1784 and 1806 many
deeds of emancipation "speak of freedom as the natural right of all men and
declare that no man has a right to enslave another."83
Those acts of manumission fit a pattern in the South after the Revolution.
Increases in the free black population indicate that many Americans
understood that the revolutionary battle cry for inalienable rights was
incompatible with the despotism of slavery. The free black population
nearly doubled between 1790 and 1800 in the Upper South from 30,158 to
56,855 and in the Lower South from 2,199 to 4,386, respectively.8 4 This
trend continued in the decade between 1800 and 1810, when the number of
free blacks in the Upper South increased to 94,095 and in the Lower South
to 14,180.85 In many cases the slaves who were freed emerged without
compensation and at the lowest level on the socioeconomic scale. Even the
change in demography can only be viewed as a partial victory, given that
the number of slaves did not diminish. In 1790, there were 517,763 slaves
77. DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE 144 (2006)
78. CHARLES W. BREWSTER, RAMBLES ABOUT PORTSMOUTH (2d ed. 1873); DAVIS, supra
note 77, at 144.
79. Frank F. Mathias, John Randolph's Freedmen: The Thwarting of a Will, 39 J. S. HIST.
263, 263 (1973).
80. Deborah A. Lee & Warren R. Hofstra, Race, Memory, and the Death of Robert
Berkeley: "A Murder... of... Horrible and Savage Barbarity", 65 J. S. HIST. 41, 57 (1999);
Shomer S. Zwelling, Robert Carter'sJourney: From Colonial Patriarchto New Nation Mystic,
38 AM. Q. 613, 613 (1986).
81. Mary Haldane Coleman, Whittier on John Randolph of Roanoke, 8 NEW ENG. Q. 551,
551-52 (1935).
82. Howard DeLong, Jeffersonian Teledemocracy, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 47, 63
(1997).
83. Luther P. Jackson, Manumission in Certain Virginia Cities, 15 J. NEGRO HIST. 278,
281 (1930); see also IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 30 (1974).
84. BERLIN, supra note 83 at 46.
85. Id.
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in Upper South and 136,358 in the Lower South.8 6 Those figures rose in
1800 to 645,682 in the Upper South and 205,850 in the Lower South,87 and
in 1810 slaves there were 802,117 slaves in the Upper South and 301,583 in
the Lower South. 88
The discrepancy between increased manumission on the one hand and
increased slave population on the other is partly attributable to the contrary
forces of sincerity and self-interest. During this period, roughly from the
time just before ratification of the Constitution and the end of slave
importation, about 91,000 slaves were imported into North America.8 9 The
birthrate of slaves also played a role in increasing the total number of slaves
despite the manumissions.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the early revolutionary
possibilities of equally protecting inalienable rights became an unrealized
aspiration that was losing its momentum. Yet, the untainted sentiments to
create a government by the people and for the people left an undeniable
foundation for later federal protections of individual rights. One of Dred
Scott's greatest failures was its unwillingness to reflect on the framers'
belief in the universality of fundamental rights, giving greater interpretive
weight to their compromises with slavery instead.
B. Rights Based Antislavery
Individual acts of manumission and kindness achieved only small scale
civil reform. Free blacks fared little better than slaves; a former general of
the Continental Army wrote that in Virginia "it is not only the slave who is
beneath his master, it is the negro who is beneath the white man." 9°
Northern states, unlike their Southern brethren, adopted policies to outlaw
slavery; 9' meanwhile, the Constitution ensnared the entire nation in the net
86. See
University
of
Virginia
Library,
Historical
Census
Browser,
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus/php/start.php?year=V1790 (last visited
Nov. 29, 2007) (click "slaves" under "Slave Population" heading, then click "submit query").
My statistics differ from BERLIN, supra note 83, partly because he included territories in his
calculation of slave population, while I only calculated the number of slaves living in the states.
87. University
of
Virginia
Library,
Historical
Census
Browser,
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus/php/start.php?year=V1800 (last visited
Nov. 29, 2007) (follow directions in supra note 86).
88.

Id.

89.

PHILIP

D.

CURTIN, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE:

A

CENSUS

140 tbl.40 (1969). I am

referring here to the 1781-1810 column of Curtin's demographic table. Id.
90. 2 FRANCOIS J. CHASTELLUX, TRAVELS IN NORTH AMERICA IN THE YEARS 1780, 1781,
and 1782, at 440 (Howard C. Rice, Jr. trans., 1963) (1787).
91. ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE
NORTH 107-229 (1967) (detailing the abolition of slavery in Northern states).

HeinOnline -- 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 1191 2007

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

1192

[Ariz. St. L.J.

of slaveholding. Nevertheless, many antislavery efforts were overtly
influenced by Revolutionary ideology.
After the Revolution, a member of the prestigious American
Philosophical Society, George Buchanan, pointed out the hypocrisy of
citizens who had "thrown off the load of oppression . . . becom[ing]
oppressors in their turn. ' 9 2 They had adopted a "fixed principle" of the
Declaration of Independence about the equality of all to be free from
oppression, but when Americans took the reins of government "they
became apostates to their principles, and riveted the fetters of slavery upon
the unfortunate Africans." 93 Benjamin Trumbull, writing in 1773, was irate
that slavery continued to flourish despite all the talk of freedom. He berated
the institution:
[I]s not this the case, when rulers are made wholly independent of
the people, when strangers unconnected with them, and
independent of them, are appointed to rule over them? Is not this
calculated to deprive a people of liberty and justice;-to render
life, property, and every dear enjoyment very precarious; and to
reduce them to a state of slavery and misery, instead of making
them free and happy? Is it not an infraction of the great and
unchangeable laws of Nature, Reason, and
Religion?94
Incompatible with the essential rights of mankind?
New Jersey Quaker leader David Cooper showed the contradiction
between principle and slavery by publishing doctrine in a left hand column
and condemning practices on the right. For one, the Declaration made much
of self-evident truths which must apply to all of humanity; but "the very
people who make these pompous declarations are slave-holders." 95
Presciently anticipating Taney's Dred Scott opinion, racial differentials in
law, Copper wrote,
tell us, that these blessings were only meant to be the rights of
whitemen [sic], not of all men: and would seem to verify the
observation of an eminent writer; "When men talk of liberty,
they mean their own liberty, and seldom
suffer their thoughts on
96
that point to stray to their neighbours.,
92. GEORGE BUCHANAN, AN ORATION UPON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL EVIL OF SLAVERY
14 (Philip Edwards 1793).
93. Id.at 13.
94. BENJAMIN TRUMBULL, A DISCOURSE, DELIVERED AT THE ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF
THE FREEMEN OF THE TowN OF NEw-HAVEN 31-32 (New Haven, Green 1773).

95. DAVID COOPER, A SERIOUS ADDRESS TO THE RULERS OF AMERICA, ON THE
INCONSISTENCY OF THEIR CONDUCT RESPECTING SLAVERY 14 (London, J. Phillips 1783).

96. Id.
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He further juxtaposed a 1774 resolve of the Continental Congress of North
Americans right to the "immutable laws of nature, are entitled to life, liberty
and property" and the treatment of blacks, since they too could justly argue
that they had never ceded their equal claim to the immutable rights to life,
liberty, and property.9 7 The point that blacks retained their human rights,
irrespective of constitutional and statutory compromises on slavery, was
lost on Taney.
Many of the most famous Revolutionary leaders drew attention to the
incongruity between American demands for freedom and their rationales for
tyrannizing slaves. Hamilton, for instance, wrote that "[n]o reason can be
assigned why one man should exercise any power, or pre eminence [sic]
over his fellow creatures more than another; unless they have voluntarily
vested him with it." 98 Thomas Paine, exhibiting a knack for penetrating
brevity in his first published article, entreated Americans to consider "with
what consistency, or decency they complain so loudly of attempts to
enslave them, while they hold so many hundred thousands in slavery; and
annually enslave many thousands more, without any pretence of authority,
or claim upon them." 99
In 1764, at the time that he was arguably the most influential agitator
against colonial regulation, James Otis mocked the racism that went handin-hand with slavery. So "shocking violation of the law of nature" could
never be excused because Africans have "short curled hair ... instead of
Christian hair, as it is called by those whose hearts are as hard as the nether
millstone."'0 0 Nor could justification for it "be drawn from a flat nose, [and]
a long or a short face."'' He viewed the institution of slavery as a despoiler
of civilization that prefers the interests of petty tyrants to the value of
liberty. In another publication, Otis mocked the paradox of opposing the
Stamp Act while leaving slavery intact: "I affirm, and that on the best
information, the Sun rises and sets every day in the sight of five millions of
his majesty's American subjects, white, brown and black."' 1 2 Theologian
Samuel Hopkins, who after the Revolution proved critical to abolishing
slavery in Rhode Island, was likewise indignant at the "shocking . . .
97. id. at 11.
98. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A FULL VINDICATION OF THE MEASURES OF THE CONGRESS 5
(New York, Rivington 1774).
99. THOMAS PAINE, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN AMERICA (1775), reprinted in I THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS PAINE 4, 7 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., AMS Press 1967) (1894).
100. JAMES OTIS, RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 43-44 (Boston,
J. Almon 1764).
101. Id.
102. JAMES OTIS, CONSIDERATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE COLONISTS 30 (2d ed. 1765).
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intolerable inconsistence" of embracing liberty while "at the same time
making slaves of many thousands of our brethren, who have as good a right
to liberty as ourselves, and to whom it is as sweet as it is to us, and the
contrary as dreadful!"' 3 The commerce in humans was against nature,
wrote Abraham Booth, because everyone, be they African or European, has
an "equal claim to personal liberty with any man upon earth."' 4 This
equality was not regarded to be a matter of citizenship but of human nature.
Everyone, it was thought, has a common share of essential rights that are
immune against indiscriminate government intrusion. To think otherwise
would fly in the face of the founding principle that "all men are created
05
equal." 1
On April 14, 1775, five days before the battles of Lexington and
Concord, the first antislavery society was born.'0 6 Then, in 1785, with John
Jay as its president, the New York Society for Promoting the Manumission
of Slaves was organized. 0 7 In 1792, similar societies operated in Delaware,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. 0 8 The
1794 delegates to the Abolition Society decried the illogic of a republic that
zealously advocated freedom to tolerate "in its bosom a body of slaves."1 9
Each slave, wrote Richard Wells, "carries about him the strongest proofs in
nature of his original rights."" Slavery was incompatible with the
proposition that "ALL the inhabitants of America are entitled to the
privileges of the inhabitants of Great-Britain.""'
On March 8, 1775, just a month before Paine played an important part in
the first antislavery society's formation, he bluntly asked Americans to
reflect on their tyrannical hypocrisy." 2 Quaker Anthony Benezet was as
poignant at using religious arguments as Paine was at using secular ones.
103. SAMUEL HOPKINS, A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE SLAVERY OF THE AFRICANS 50
(Norwich, Spooner 1776).
104. ABRAHAM BOOTH, COMMERCE IN THE HUMAN SPECIES, AND THE ENSLAVING OF
INNOCENT PERSONS, INIMICAL TO THE LAWS OF MOSES AND THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST 18 (London,
Wayland 1792).
105. JAMES DANA, DOCTOR DANA'S SERMON ON THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 28 (1790)
(quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
106. Lorenzo Dow Turner, The Anti-Slavery Movement Prior to the Abolition of the
African Slave-Trade (1641-1808), 14 J. NEGRO HIST. 373, 396 n.80 (1929).
107. J. FRANKLIN JAMESON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL
MOVEMENT 23-24 (Beacon Press 1956) (1926).
108. Id. at 24.
109. ADDRESS OF A CONVENTION OF DELEGATES FROM THE ABOLITION SOCIETY, TO THE
CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (New York, Durell 1794).
110. RICHARD J. WELLS, A FEw POLITICAL REFLECTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 81 (Philadelphia, Dunlap 1774).
111. Id. at80.
112. PAINE, supra note 99, at 7.
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Back in the 1760s, Benezet, who was one of the most influential abolitionist
forerunners,
related people's natural equality to their identity as a
"species.""' 3 None was naturally superior since the "black-skin'd and the
white-skin'd" were "all of the human Race.""' 4 Given the broad consensus
that slavery lacked any legitimacy, it is no surprise, as the historian
Winthrop D. Jordan summarized, that in the years preceding the Revolution
' 15
a general impression prevailed that slavery was a "communal sin.""
Dred Scott, of course, would prove to be absolutely oblivious to these
ideas.1 16 Taney's opinion would fixate on the existence of slavery during the
Revolution rather than the Constitution-drafting generation's overwhelming
consensus that the institution was in conflict with the humanitarian purposes
of republican government.
In the North, the clarity of Revolutionary tenets led to various forms of
emancipation. Prior to the Revolution, slavery was legal in all thirteen
colonies." 7 In 1774, the Continental Congress required that the importation
of slaves cease after December 1, 1775, but it lacked the power to enforce
the decree." 8 Historian and sociologist W.E.B. Dubois pointed out that the
colonists' motives for ending the trade were complex, including a genuine
commitment to the philosophy of freedom in the Northern and Middle
states, fear of slave insurrections fomented by newly arrived Africans,
domestic slave breeders' economic self-interests, and a strategic decision to
harm British commerce." 9 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 prohibited the
slave trade, slavery, and involuntary servitude from being introduced into
the territory. 120 Yet it was an imperfect provision that contained an article

113. See ANTHONY BENEZET, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THAT PART OF AFRICA, INHABITED BY

THE NEGROES 36-38 (2d ed. Philadelphia, Dunlap 1762).
114. Id. at38.
115. See JORDAN, supra note 68 at 298.
116. See infra Part III.
117. PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY

MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 20 (1999); PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY:

1619-1877, at 78-79 (1993) (describing emancipation in the North); DUNCAN J. MACLEOD,
SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 98-99 (1974) (discussing abolition during the
Revolutionary Era); ZILVERSMIT, supra note 91, at 116 (indicating that Vermont passed the first
law to abolish slavery in 1777).
118. Michael Daly Hawkins, John Quincy Adams in the Antebellum Maritime Slave Trade:
The Politics of Slavery and the Slavery of Politics, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000);
William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteenth States, 31 U.
RICH. L. REV. 111, 172 n.401 (1997).
119. W. E. BURGHARDT DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870, at 45-57 (Cambridge, Univ. Press 1904) (1896).
120. PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877, at 78-79 (1993).
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to lawfully reclaim fugitive slaves or indentured servants
allowing masters
21
1
there.
who fled
Several states ended slave importation. This development began in 1774,
when Rhode Island restricted the slave trade. The preface to the law
explained that the state had decided "those who are desirous of enjoying all
the advantages of liberty themselves, should be willing to extend personal
liberty to others."' 2 2 Rhode Island did not follow that policy to its ultimate
conclusion, continuing to allow slave traders to temporarily bring their
cargo into the state from the West Indies. 123 The same year, Connecticut
also prohibited slave importation. 124 In the South, the slave trade was
prohibited by Delaware (1776), Virginia (1778), and Maryland (1783).25 In
1786, North Carolina enacted a prohibitory tax on the practice, and South
Carolina prohibited importation in 1787 but reneged on that decision in
1803.126

The Northern emancipation of slaves manifested an even greater
commitment to revolutionary ideals. The Vermont Constitution outlawed
slavery in 1777, ten years before the federal Constitution had even been
drafted. 127 Likewise the New Hampshire bill of rights of 1784 appears to
have been the primary means for ending slavery there. It afforded even
greater safeguards to vulnerable classes than would the federal Bill of
Rights. New Hampshire provided that the natural rights to life, liberty and
property "shall not be denied or abridged by this state on account of race,
creed, color, sex or national origin." 128 Toward the same end, Massachusetts
Chief Justice William Cushing of the Superior Court declared slavery to be
against the constitutional principle ' of
natural rights, according to which
29
equal."'
and
"free
everyone was born
121. The Northwest Ordinance, art. VI, 1 Stat. 50, 53 (1789).
122. QUARLES, supra note 76, at 41.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 40-41.
125. Patrick S. Brady, The Slave Trade and Sectionalism in South Carolina,1787-1808, 38
J. S. HIST. 601, 602 n.2 (1972) (recounting that Maryland ended slave trade in 1783); William
Cohen, Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of Slavery, 56 J. AM. HIST. 503, 508 (1969) (stating
that Virginia outlawed slave trade in 1778); James Wilford Gamer, Amendment of State
Constitutions, 1 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 213, 217 (1907) (stating that the Delaware Constitution of
1776 forbade the establishment of slavery).
126. Brady, supra note 125, at 601, 602 n.2 (providing information on North Carolina and
South Carolina); Joyce E. Chaplin, Creating a Cotton South in Georgia and South Carolina,
1760-1815, 57 J. S. HIST. 171, 191 (1991).
127. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, §1, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/states/vt01 .htm.
128. N.H.
CONST. of 1784, art. II,
available at http://www.state.nh.us/
constitution/billofights.html.
129. PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS 353 (1975).
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Some Northern states, like Pennsylvania in 1780, only gradually
transitioned from slavery.130 Similarly gradual laws were enacted by Rhode
Island and Connecticut in 1784, New York in 1799, and New Jersey in
1804.13' Gradualism recognized the incompatibility of revolutionary ideals
with slavery, but nevertheless temporarily validated slave holders' property
interest. In contrast with the North, no Southern state outlawed slavery. The
closest provisions to abolition there during the 1780s and 1790s were laws
recognizing masters' right32 to manumit slaves, which passed in Virginia,
Delaware, and Maryland.
For most of those who were gradually or immediately manumitted,
liberty entailed scarcely any of the privileges and immunities of citizenship.
They emerged from slavery uncompensated for their years of toil and
without the right to participate in the political process. Revolutionaries, who
believed in the universality of natural rights, proved themselves unwilling to
shed the prejudices of their era. Even the original Constitution, which was
to be the model for republican self-government, contained guarantees for
perpetuating slavery.

130. John M. Mecklin, The Evolution of Slave Status in American Democracy, 2 J. NEGRO
HIST. 229, 230 (1917); Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE
L.J. 1033, 1045 n.45 (1997).
131. See JAMESON, supra note 107, at 25; 10 RECORDS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND 132 (John Russel Bartlett ed., New York,
AMS Press 1865) ("[E]very negro or mulatto child born after the first day of March, A.D. 1784,
be supported and maintained by the owner of the mother of such child, to the age of twenty-one
years, provided the owner of the mother shall during that time hold her as a slave; or otherwise,
upon the manumission of such mother .... "); Lois E. Horton, From Class to Race in Early
America: Northern Post-EmancipationRacial Reconstruction, 19 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 629, 639
(1999). By 1830, fewer than 3,000 blacks remained enslaved, while 125,000 blacks lived freely
in the northern and middle states. Gordon S. Wood, Revolution and the Political Integration of
the Enslaved & Disenfranchised, Address Before the House of Representatives' Chamber,
Kentucky State Capitol (Jan. 9, 1974), in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RESEARCH 13 (1974).
132. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE 49 (1978); KOLCHIN, supra notel 20,
at 77; David Skillen Bogen, The Maryland Context of Dred Scott: The Decline in the Legal
Status of Maryland Free Blacks 1776-1810, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 381, 392 (1990) (regarding
manumission in Maryland); Luther P. Jackson, Religious Development of the Negro in Virginia
from 1760 to 1860, 16 J. NEGRO HIST. 168, 179 (1931) (discussing the history of manumission
in Virginia); Marianne Buroff Sheldon, Black-White Relations in Richmond, Virginia, 17821820, 45 J. S. HIST. 27, 33 (1979) (mentioning the Virginia manumission act of 1782); Delaware
http://www.slaveryinamerica.org/
Record,
and
Summary
Law
Slave
geography/slavejlaws_DE.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
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C. Strayingfrom NationalAspirations
For the sake of national unity, the original Constitution compromised the
human rights principles of the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble. Several clauses left slave policies at the discretion of the states.
Dred Scott later relied on those clauses to draw the inference that slavery
was a constitutionally protected form of property.' 33 Any attempt to keep it
out of the federal territories, as by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, was
an overreaching on the part of the federal government.
The framers' decision to use "person held to Service or Labour," "such
persons," and "other persons" instead of "slaves" and "slavery" indicated
that some of them expected the institution to gradually vanish without any
constitutional changes.' 34 Whatever their wishes, the Constitution facilitated
slavery's spread through overt protections of the institution for which the
founding generation bears much responsibility. The most glaring
protections of slavery came in the form of the Importation, Three-Fifths,
and Fugitive Slave Clauses.1 35 The Importation Clause prohibited Congress
from abolishing the international slave trade for twenty years after state
ratification of the Constitution.1

6

The Three-Fifths Clause provided that

slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a person for the purpose 1of
37
determining how many representatives a state was to have in Congress.
The Fugitive Slave Clause, 138 which passed without any dissenting votes at
the Constitutional Convention,' 39 required fugitives to be returned "on
133. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856).
134. See generally Tsesis, supra note 12, at 320.
135. See id. at 319-22; see also WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY
COMPACT 3-7 (Negro University Press 1969) (1844); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-83 (1977); Frederick
Douglas, The North Star, Apr. 5, 1850, reprintedin VOICES FROM THE GATHERING STORM: THE
COMING OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 40-41 (Glenn M. Linden ed., 2001); Frederick Douglas,
The North Star, Feb. 9, 1849, reprinted in THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLAS:

EARLY YEARS, 1817-1849, at 352-53 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950); Frederick Douglas, The
Revolution of 1848, Speech at West India Emancipation Celebration, Rochester, New York
(Aug. 1, 1848), in THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLAS: EARLY YEARS, 1817-1849,
at 321-30 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
137. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
138. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
139. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTr CASE in

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13 (1981) (disputing the view that the Fugitive Slave Clause was
indispensable to the success of the Constitutional Convention); Raymond T. Diamond, No Call
to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L.

REV. 93, 121 (1989) (asserting that the Fugitive Slave Clause did not arouse much debate at the
Constitutional Convention because it was not a significant issue); Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 613 (1993) (asserting that while the "initial
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demand" and prohibited free states from liberating them.140 Less overt,
although no less protective of slavery, were clauses directing the
apportionment of taxes among the states pursuant to the Three-Fifths
Clause; 14 1 the Insurrection Clause, 142 giving Congress power to call up the
14 3
militia to suppress slave revolts; the Domestic Violence Clause;
and a
44
unamendable.
Clause
Importation
the
separate clause making
These constitutional provisions established the foundation for the private
property rights of whites, on which Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott
opinion placed great emphasis, 145 to trump any universal notions of liberty
and equality. Dred Scott's denial that the federal government had the
authority to prohibit slave property in the territories rested on a racially
exclusionary notion of citizenship.
III. DRED SCOT

By the early nineteenth century proslavery advocates mocked
revolutionary claims of natural equality. Writers like George Fitzhugh
popularized the view that slavery was a positive good both for whites and
blacks. 146 William Grayson, who served in the U.S. Congress, claimed that
slavery subdued blacks' "savage heart,"' 147 making a racial distinction that
implied blacks should not be treated as fully human citizens under the law.
South Carolina Senator and one-time Governor James H. Hammond
supported subjugating blacks, as a class, to white citizens: "In all social
systems there must be a class to do the mean duties, to perform the drudgery
of life. That is, a class requiring but a low order of intellect and but little
response" to South Carolina's proposed fugitive slave provision "was hostile," the
Constitutional Convention "with neither debate nor formal vote, adopted the fugitive slave
provision as a separate article of the draft constitution").
140. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 575 (1842).
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
143. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
144. U.S. CONST. art. V; see Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of
Originalism: Clarence Thomas at the Rubicon, 16 LAW & INEQ. 429, 469 (1998) (arguing that
Article V can be viewed as "the Framers' insurance policy against the possibility that thenexcluded groups, including women, blacks and free blacks, could one day change the power
structure the Founders had erected without regard for the needs, views, and priorities of the
members of those groups").
145. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-07 (1856).
146. See IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM

SOUTH 364 (1974).
147. William J. Grayson, Hireling & the Slave, in SLAVERY DEFENDED 57, 64 (Eric L.
McKitrick ed., Prentice-Hall 1963) (1856).
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skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, fidelity., 148 Dred Scott's rejection of
universal rights was related 149to proslavery statements, justifying the
oppressive treatment of blacks.
Chief Justice Taney's opinion referred to the founding generation several
times, holding that African Americans, like Scott, could never be citizens of
a state for diversity jurisdiction purposes. 5 ° This meant that federal courts
lacked the authority to entertain his freedom suit. His opinion for the
majority not only denied blacks had fundamental citizenship rights but also
rejected Congress's authority to protect such rights against state
infringement.' 5' Taney's perspective on citizenship distorted the historical
record, and, as I discuss in later portions of this Article, was eventually
rejected by Americans through the Reconstruction Amendments, but his
narrow perspective of federal civil rights authority continues to periodically
rear its head in Supreme Court decisions.
Dred Scott was decided at a time of repeated national compromises with
slavery. Beginning with slave-protecting constitutional provisions,
safeguards for Southern slavery were later embedded into parts of the
Missouri Compromise, the Compromise of 1850, and Kansas-Nebraska
Act. 152 Even before the Dred Scott opinion inflamed hostilities between the
North and South, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 had abrogated Missouri
Compromise's prohibition against the introduction of slavery above the
36030 ' parallel. 51 3 The Act provided that Kansas and Nebraska be "received
into the Union with or without slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe
at the time of their admission."1 54 What remained for the Court to decide
148. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 962 (1858).
149. See WILLIAM SUMMER JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY
(Peter Smith 1960) (1935).
150. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 406-11.

THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH

168-69

151. Id. at 405-06.
152. Beginning with the Missouri Compromise (1820) through the South Carolina
Nullification Crises in Jacksonian America (1833), the Compromise of 1850, the KansasNebraska controversy (1852-54), and onto secession (1860) and the Civil War (1861), all
internal conflicts centered on slavery. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 23-31 (2004).
153. Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 14, 10 Stat. 277, 282-83. For background on
the Kansas-Nebraska Controversy, see ARTHUR C. COLE, THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT 1850-

1865, at 272-75 (1934);

AVERY CRAVEN, THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR

325-26, 328-31

(1942); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 121, 123
(Ballantine Books 1989) (1988); 2 ALLAN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION 86-88, 92, 98, 10305, 107-08, 121 (1947); ROBERT R. RUSSET, CRITICAL STUDIES IN ANTEBELLUM SECTIONALISM
25-48 (1972); LAWRENCE R. TENZER, THE FORGOTTEN CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR: A NEW LOOK
AT THE SLAVERY ISSUE 89 (1997); James Ford Rhodes, Antecedents of the American Civil War,
in THE CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 49, 56 (Edwin C. Rozwenc ed., 2d ed. 1972).
154. Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 § 19.
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was whether Congress ever had the power to constitutionally prohibit
slavery in the United States's territories.
Key events to Mr. Scott's suit for freedom are familiar and are recounted
with a fair degree of accuracy in Dred Scott's statement of the facts. Scott
lived on free land for the first time in 1834, when his holder, an army
physician named John Emerson, was sent to Fort Armstrong in Rock Island,
Illinois.'55 In 1836, when Fort Armstrong closed, Scott accompanied
Emerson to his new assignment in Fort Snelling, located in the northern part
of the Louisiana Purchase, then known as the Wisconsin territory and now
part of the state of Minnesota. 5 6 That territory was free by virtue of the
Missouri Compromise. While at Fort Snelling, Scott married, something he
could not have lawfully done in any Southern state. 157 From there, Emerson
was transferred to St. Louis, Missouri and then to Louisiana. 158 When
Emerson died, in 1843, Scott was bequeathed to Emerson's wife. 159 Shortly
thereafter, in 1846, Scott brought suit in a state court for his freedom against
Emerson's widow, whom he claimed beat him. 6 ° Although he won his
freedom at the trial level, he lost it after Ms. Emerson's appeal to the
Supreme Court of Missouri.161
That would have ended the case, but by a strange twist of events, Ms.
Emerson married an abolitionist, Calvin C. Chaffee, who was later elected
to Congress, and she moved to live with him in Massachusetts. 62 She left
Scott to live in St. Louis, under the ownership of her brother, John Sanford,
a citizen of New York and administrator of his deceased brother-in-law's
estate. 163 This provided a new defendant against whom Scott filed suit in
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.64 When the district court
found it had jurisdiction and entered a judgment in favor of Sanford, Scott
65
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

155. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 397.
156. Id. at 493 (Campbell, J., concurring in the judgment).
157. Id. at 398.
158. Id. at 397-98.
159. Id. at 398.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 399.
162. DAVID M. POTrER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 290 (1976); Walter Ehrlich,
Was the Dred Scott Case Valid?, 55 J. AM. HIST. 256, 259, 264 (1968).
163. Ehrlich, supra note 162, at 257, 259-60.
164. Id. at 262.
165. Id. at 257. For further elaboration of the facts, see WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No
RIGHTS: DRED ScoTr's STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 9-81 (1979); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE
DRED SCOTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW & POLITICS 239-83 (1978); DAVID M.
POTIrER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 268-69, 276-77 (Don R. Fehrenbached ed.,
1976).
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The justices who heard the case seemed to be a sectionally balanced
bunch, with five Southerners and four Northerners. Nevertheless, at least
seven of them, everyone except Justices John McLean of Ohio and
Benjamin R. Curtis of Massachusetts, had markedly pro-Southern leanings
on the issue of slavery. Ironically, Chief Justice Taney of Maryland had
freed nearly all of his slaves and even provided a monthly pension to those
among them who were too old to work. 166 He even helped a free black in
purchasing his wife by fronting him the money and binding him until the
loan was repaid. 167 Yet, these were not, as they might first appear, signs of
opposition to institution of slavery. As an Attorney General under President
Andrew Jackson, Taney took the position that blacks were undeniably subcitizens.1 68 "The African race in the United States even when free," he
declared, "are every where a degraded class, and exercise no political
influence. The privileges they are allowed to enjoy, are accorded to them as
a matter of kindness and benevolence rather than of right." 169 As a Supreme
Court Justice, Taney was in the concurrence to Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
which invalidated a Pennsylvania law and upheld the constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.170 Unlike the majority in Prigg, Taney believed
the Act of 1793 required states to assist in the recapture. 17 ' Taney was later
able to garner a majority for his position in Ableman v. Booth, which upheld
the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 with its provision requiring state citizens to
172
help to arrest fugitives.
Another member of the Dred Scott Court, Justice John A. Campbell of
Alabama, had also manumitted his slaves.17 3 He was, however, so
passionately pro-Southern that at the outbreak of the Civil War, he quit the
Supreme Court, and eventually become the Assistant Secretary of War to
the Confederacy. 174 The other three Southerners, Justices James M. Wayne
of Georgia, Peter V. Daniel of Virginia, and John Catron of Tennessee,
were slave owners, and therefore had an indirect interest in the outcome of

166. CARL B. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 94 (1935); F. H. Hodder, Some Phases of the
Dred Scott Case, 16 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 3, 17 (1929); Robert M. Spector, Lincoln and
Taney: A Study in ConstitutionalPolarization,15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 199, 211-12 (1971).
167. SWISHER, supra note 166, at 94.
168. Id. at 140, 154.
169. Id. at 154.
170. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 626 (1842).
171. Id. at 628.
172. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 522-26 (1858).
173. HENRY G. CONNOR, JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1853-1861, at 71 (Leonard W. Levy ed., DaCapo Press 1971) (1920).
174. Id. at 149, 158.
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Dred Scott. 75 The other two Northerners, besides Justices McLean and
Curtis, were committed to Democratic appeasement of Southerners. Justice
Samuel Nelson of New York winked at slave trading in New York, 176 and
he, like Justice Robert C. Grier of Pennsylvania, while acting as designated
circuit justices, repeatedly enforced the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and
1850 while counseling the North against the risks to the Union of
resistance. 177
Taney wrote a fractured opinion for the Court. Six other justices agreed
with him that Scott had not gained his freedom when he lived in the
Wisconsin Territory, but all of them decided to write separate concurrences
to explain their distinct rationales. 78 The first part of Taney's opinion
denied that Scott was a citizen of any state or the United States.'7 9 This was
fatal to Scott's ability to have a federal court adjudicate his claim. Taney
presumed that states never meant for black inhabitants to be citizens. At the
time of the nation's founding, Taney noted, no state other than Maine
allowed the "African race" to "participate equally with the whites in the
exercise of civil and political rights."' 80 We need not spend much time on
the fallacy of Taney's induction since it was long ago refuted in Justice
Curtis's dissent which showed that, at the time of the founding, blacks had
been citizens of several states (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York,
New Jersey, and North Carolina) that granted them voting privileges.' 8 The
crux of Curtis's argument was that when the Union was formed, blacks
obtained national citizenship by virtue of their state citizenship status.'8 2
The limiting factor of Curtis's dissent was that if a state, like Virginia, did
not grant a class of persons citizenship, they could never be citizens of the
175. JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING 58 (1964); ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE,
JAMES MOORE WAYNE: SOUTHERN UNIONIST 144-45 (1943); J. Merton England, The Free
Negro in Ante-Bellum Tennessee, 9 J. S. HIST. 37, 46-47 (1943).
176. Donald M. Roper, In Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall Court and the
Legitimation of Slavery, 21 STAN. L. REV. 532, 535 n.17 (1969).
177. Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1013, 1014 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 18,262).
Nelson put the Onus of Unity on the North helping in the capture of fugitives: "They must
determine it, and the responsibility rests upon them. If they abide by the constitution-the
whole and every part of it-all will be well. If they expect the Union to be saved, and to enjoy
the blessings flowing from it, short of this, they will find themselves mistaken when it is too
late." Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1007 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 18,261); Ex parte
Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7,259); Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F. Cas.
1036 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 16,865).
178. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454-529 (1856) (concurring
opinions).
179. Id. at 400 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at416.
181. Id. at 572-73 (Curtis, J. dissenting).
182. Id.
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United States.'83 Instead of rehashing this argument, this Article
concentrates on the inaccuracy of Taney's white-supremacist notion of
revolutionary ideology.
Part II demonstrated that statements about the universality of natural
rights were widely shared during the Revolutionary Period. One of Taney's
opening salvos was his claim that any reference to "the people of the United
States" in the Preamble was "not intended to" apply to blacks. 8 4 This
conjecture denied that the federal government's obligations to secure "the
blessings of liberty" and to promote the general welfare extended to
blacks. 185

Contrary to Taney's assertion, the founding generation held a much more
nuanced and egalitarian point of view. In 1778, an American jurist wrote
186
that those rights people "possess at birth are equal, and of the same kind."'
John Adams held a similar sentiment. As he saw it, inalienable rights are
divinely granted and cannot be "repealed or restrained by human laws"
because they are antecedent "to all earthly government."' 87 Moreover, no
person could dispossess himself of those rights that are intrinsic to human
nature and the rights to life and liberty fit into this category. 88 Except for
those proslavery thinkers who thought that blacks were members of a
human subspecies,'89 Africans like all other persons had to be included in
the category of living beings with inalienable rights.
Standard texts written at the time of the nation's founding, which
developed the structure of the American government, are conspicuously
devoid of racial differentiation about fundamental rights. The Federalist,
arguably the most influential political science work of its time, explores
government's obligation to secure the "public good" for the "great body of
the people" but never mentions any racial disjunctions.19° Likewise, the Bill
of Rights makes no racial distinctions. On the subject of equally inalienable
rights, the Declaration differed from the language of several state
constitutions only in so far as it was explicitly inspired by theism. The
183. Id.
184. Id. at 404 (majority opinion).
185. Id. at414.
186. RESULT OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES HOLDEN AT IPSWICH IN THE COUNTY OF
ESSEX (1778), reprinted in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 365
(Boston, 1861).
187. JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON & FEUDAL LAW, in 3 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 477,480 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851) (1782).
188. HAMPDEN, THE ALARM (No. 111) (Oct. 15, 1773).
189. See 2 EDWARD LONG, THE HISTORY OF JAMAICA 353-73 (2d ed., Frank Cass & Co.
Ltd. 1970) (1774) (taxonomizing blacks somewhere between humans and simians); PERSONAL
SLAVERY ESTABLISHED 18 (Philadelphia, John Dunlap 1773) (1773).
190. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 309 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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Virginia Constitution of 1776 asserted that "all men are by nature equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they
enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety."' 9' Virginia's retention of slavery despite this highbrow
language might have been taken to confirm Taney's view that the early
republic meant to only protect whites. 192 But that interpretation is belied by
Jefferson's earlier draft of the Declaration, 93 as well as luminaries like
Mason and Henry who indicated their understanding that the universalism
of their claims could not be limited by race. 194 The North, with its postRevolutionary emancipatory acts, proved willing to at least follow the path
that the rhetoric on inalienable rights revealed for a government by the
people and for the people. 95
Besides the outright denial that blacks were thought of as "the people of
the United States" by those who accepted the nation's cornerstone
documents, Taney maintained that even if some states granted blacks
citizenship rights, it did not follow that they also enjoyed the privileges of
national citizenship.' 96 That postulate ignored that there may be inalienable
rights that neither federal or state governments can infringe. Not only did
the Bill of Rights assure states that they would keep certain rights that were
not delegated to the United States,' 97 but the people likewise retained
unenumerated rights that went well beyond the explicit provisions of the
first ten amendments. 98
Many of the founding generation, especially the Federalists, worried that
by including a bill of rights in the Constitution they would be implying that
it provided an exhaustive list of rights. Hamilton explained, in The
Federalist No. 84, that in the past bills of rights had been grants from kings
to their subjects. 99 Such grants were unnecessary in America where the
power of government came from the people, who "surrender nothing" of
their inalienable rights and therefore need not explicitly reserve any part of
191. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 1.
192. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
193. See supra text accompanying note 71.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 56-72.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44. Although, various discriminatory practices
persisted throughout the North even after emancipation. See generally LEON F. LrIWACK,
NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES,

196.
197.
198.
199.

1790-1860 (1961).

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
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them.2 ° James Wilson proudly distinguished British citizens' need for a
declaration of rights from the American citizens' implicit retention of rights
against governmental interference. According to Wilson, the Magna Charta
regarded the declared liberties to be "the gift or grant of the king;" on the
other hand, the Constitution was a grant of power to government from the
people who would not part with their natural liberties. 20 ' Thomas Hartley
explained further that since the people delegated power to government
through the Constitution, "whatever portion of those natural rights we did
not transfer to the government was still reserved and retained by the
people., 20 2 During the North Carolina ratification convention, a participant
argued that "if there be certain rights which never can, nor ought to be given
merely because we have
up, these rights cannot be said to be given away,
23
omitted to say that we have not given them up.

The implication of this early support for a constitution without a bill of
rights was that there are certain interests that people have by nature, simply
by virtue of being human, that are not derived from state or federal
governments and which they cannot take away. Thus, the many colonists
who wanted to degrade blacks to perpetual slavery could not intrude on
fundamental rights that lay altogether outside the province of governmental
authority. The lack of a bill of rights mistakenly presumed that
representative government would protect the people's natural rights,
especially their right to property. The principle that "all men are created
equal" 2°4 in respect to inalienable rights implied that even if Taney were
right and in practical terms the founding generation meant to protect only
whites their exclusionism could neither diminish nor abridge what was
ultimately hereditary. From this perspective, Taney's question of whether
the Constitution "embraced the negro African race ', 205 was misformulated.
The better question was whether the underlying national commitment to
safeguarding inalienable rights enabled the federal government to prevent
the exploitation of minorities in territories under its exclusive control. James
200. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 190, at 578.
201. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 382, 383-84 (Merril
Jensen ed., 1976).
202. Thomas Hartley, Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 430 (Merril Jensen ed.,
1976).
203. Mr. Maclaine (N.C.) Address in Committee of the Whole House (July 29, 1788), in 4
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 161 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
204. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).

205. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).

HeinOnline -- 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 1206 2007

39:1179]

UNDERMINING INALIENABLE RIGHTS

1207

Madison had written to Thomas Jefferson expressing the obligation of
representative government to prevent political majorities from exploiting
minorities.20 6
The Dred Scott Court failed to provide minority protections. To the
contrary, it viewed slavery through the lens of majoritarian tyranny,
interpreting "all men are created equal" to be inapplicable to blacks. 20 7 It
concerns "neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor
their descendants, whether they had become free or not." He drew this
conclusion from no historical source. Rather than analyzing the implications
of revolutionary rhetoric, he drew his conclusions from the practice of
buying and selling blacks and treating them as "an ordinary article of
merchandise and traffic., 20 8 They were treated and "regarded as beings of an
inferior order., 20 9 His supremacist stereotype read blacks out of the
Constitution's reference to "the people" and "men," whose inalienable
rights were heralded by the Declaration. If the languages of that document
meant to include blacks, Taney emphasized "the conduct of the
distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have
' 210
been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted.
Taney's opinion did not so much as consider whether the Declaration
gave voice to the universal ideals of the Revolution,211 even though many of
its signatories failed to put them into practice. As we saw earlier, Patrick
Henry was explicit about this point, writing that while his generation was
proclaiming "the rights of Humanity" he continued to be a master of slaves,2
21
being "drawn along by ye general Inconvenience of living without them.,
Paine, who was involved in antislavery efforts, also wrote of the
inconsistency of enslaving others while fighting for one's liberty.21 3
Essentially, Taney was wrong to think that the framers meant only to
include whites in the national framework; to the contrary, many of them

206. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
295, 298 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) ("Wherever the real power in a
Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in
the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is cheifly [sic] to be
apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from
acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.").
207. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 410.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 29-44.
212. Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), in GEORGE S. BROOKES,
JAMES MADISON

FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET

443-44 (1937).

213. See PAINE, supra note 99, at 7.
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recognized their own hypocrisy but for personal and national interests chose
to persist in it.
In opposing the Boston Port Act, Baptist preacher John Allen
demonstrated his evenhandedness by denouncing slaveholders. He labeled
them "trifling patriots" and "pretended votaries for Freedom" who trampled
on the natural rights and privileges of Africans even as they made a "vain
parade of being advocates of the liberties of mankind."2' 1 4 Many blacks
sensed the possibility during this time to change their status. A group of
black petitioners from New Hampshire deduced that since "freedom is an
inherent right of the human species," then slavery must be a detestable form
of tyranny." ' Another group writing to Massachusetts Governor Thomas
Hutchinson in the 1770s protested that they had "in comon [sic] with other
men a naturel [sic] right to be free and without molestation to injoy [sic]"
21 6
their property.
These sentiments seem to have been shared by a large number of white
colonists. Worcester instructed its representative to the Massachusetts
General Court, the state's legislature, to use his "influence to obtain a law to
put an end to that unchristian and impolitic practice of making slaves of the
human species in this province. 2 1 7 On January 12, 1775, a group from
Darien County, Georgia bristled at the notion that the colonial struggle
should be thought in pragmatic terms: "To show the world that we are not
influenced by any contracted or interested motives, but a general philosophy
for all mankind, of whatever climate, language, or complexion, we hereby
declare our disapprobation and abhorrence of the unnatural practice of
Slavery in America.
Fourth of July orations throughout the country made reference to such
sentiments as a matter of course. A Philadelphia newspaper recounted that
two of the 1792 Independence Day celebration toasts were for "The
daughters of America" and "The people of Africa. 2' 1 9 The next year, the
same paper transcribed the Order of Cincinnati's Independence Day toast to
the "human race-may the great family of mankind without distinction of
countries or colours, be united . . . and enjoy liberty as a common
inheritance. "220 In a later year, celebrating the holiday in Maryland, a toast
214.
215.
216.
217.

JOHN ALLEN, THE WATCHMAN'S ALARM TO LORD N---H 27-28 (Salem, Mass. 1774).
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 291 (1968).
3 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 432-33 (5th ser. 1877).
WILLIAM LINCOLN, HISTORY OF WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS FROM ITS EARLIEST
SETTLEMENT TO SEPTEMBER 1836, at 68 (Worcester, Hersey 1862).
218. PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS: FROM AFRICA TO THE EMERGENCE
OF THE COTTON KINGDOM 303-04 (1975).

219. THE GENERAL ADVERTISER (Philadelphia), July 6, 1792, at 3.
220. THE GENERAL ADVERTISER (Philadelphia), July 6, 1793, at 3.
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contained the message that slavery was "[c]ontrary to the declaration that
'all men are created equal,' may Congress consider the necessity of an
immediate eradication of this evil. 22'
In addition to Taney's narrow construction of revolutionary ideology, his
opinion relied on slavery-protecting clauses of the U.S. Constitution:
The only two provisions which point to them [Negroes] and
include them, treat them as property, and make it the duty of the
Government to protect it; no other power, in relation to this race, is
to be found in the Constitution: . . . leaving it altogether with the

several States to deal with this race, whether emancipated or not,
as each State may think justice, humanity, and the interests and
safety of society, require. 222
Taney not only showed too much "respect due to these States" but also an
overly indulgent "respect to the State sovereignties.,, 223 His opinion denies
federal interest in redressing civil rights issues and leaves them to the sole
discretion of the states.22 4 The compromises with slaveocracy made at the
Philadelphia Constitution Convention glaringly contradict the purposes of
the Revolution 2 25 but Taney was unwilling to reflect on the underlying
purposes of republican government; relying, instead, on the plain language
of slave protecting clauses of the constitution.226 Yet, as has been pointed
out by others, even the text of the Constitution purposefully excluded any
reference to race. The framers
seem to have conscientiously avoided the
227
"slavery.',
or
terms "slave"
One further explanation for the inexcusable inclusion of the Three-Fifths,
Importation, and Fugitive Slave Clauses, beyond the perceived need for
compromise, might be the unrealistic belief of the period that slavery would
wither away of its own, without any legal intervention. As Benjamin Rush,
a former member of the Continental Congress and an intimate friend of two
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

BALTIMORE PATRIOT & MERCANTILE ADVERTISER, July 9, 1818, at 2.

Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 425-26 (1856).
Id. at 416.
See id. at416-17.
See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-84 (1977).
226. See supra text accompanying note 222.
227. The Constitution of the Confederate States of America, unlike the United States
Constitution, overtly protected "Negro slavery." EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE
NATION, 1861-1865, at 313 (1979). Moreover, the Confederate Constitution excluded persons
of African descent from civil protections: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
denying or impairing the right to property in Negro slaves, shall be passed." Id. The entire
Confederate Constitution is reprinted in id. at 307-22 (1979). For a further discussion on the
Confederate Constitution, see Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A
Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 543-44 (2002).
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U.S. presidents, explained in a 1774 letter to the British Abolitionist
Granville Sharp, "[t]he cause of African freedom in America continues to
gain ground., 228 He expected slavery in America to end within forty years.
The same year that Rush wrote his letter, Jefferson unsuccessfully tried to
have Virginia adopt the statement that "'the abolition of domestick slavery
is the greatest object of desire of these colonies.' ' 229 Madison's statement at
the Constitutional Convention is also indicative of the explicit repudiation
of slavery even as it was being entrenched into the nation's fundamental
law. "We have seen," he said "the mere distinction of colour made in the
most enlightened period of time, a ground to the most oppressive dominion
ever exercised by man over man., 230 The constitutional willingness to
compromise with the advocates of slavery is attributable not only to racism
but also the perception that union should come first and abolition later.
Another controversial part of Taney's opinion dealt with the merits of
Scott's case. 231' His finding that Dred Scott lacked any recognizable form of
citizenship should have led to a dismissal based on the Court's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Rather than exercising judicial restraint,
however, Taney determined to resolve decades of sectional conflict in one
fell swoop. The Missouri Compromise, he asserted, violated the Fifth
Amendment substantive due process rights of slaveowners to enjoy property
in any and all parts of the United States, including the territories.232 While
Congress's powers over the territories were extensive, they were delimited
by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against the deprivation of property
without due process.23 3 Thus, the Missouri Compromise had been an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority. Scott could never have
become free even though he had lived in federal territory North of the 360
30' because, as Taney saw it, it was unconstitutional for Congress to
encroach on slaveholders' property right to own, travel, and enjoy their
human chattel.234

228. Letter from Benjamin Rush to Granville Sharp (May 13, 1774), in The
Correspondenceof Benjamin Rush and Granville Sharp, 1773-1809, 1 J. AM. STUD. 1, 5 (John
A. Woods ed., 1967).
229. Guion Griffis Johnson, The Impact of War Upon the Negro, 10 J. NEGRO EDUC. 596,
599 (1941) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH
AMERICANS (1774), reprintedin 4 AMERICAN ARCHIVES 969 (Peter Force, ed., 1834)).
230. Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98
YALE L.J. 449, 490 n. 192 (1989) (quoting M. MEYERS, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 72 (1981)).
231. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-27 (1856).
232. Id. at 450, 452.
233. Id. at 451-52.
234. See id. at 432.
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Just as with the citizenship question, the decision that Congress lacked
power to limit property in slaves relegated individuals' fundamental rights
to the exclusive control of the states. Dred Scott considered congressional
attempts to affect slavery, to confine it to only some parts of the country,
and to prohibit it elsewhere to be both interference with individuals'
property rights and with states' rights.235 In another decision drafted by
Taney, Strader v. Graham, the Court similarly resorted to state prerogatives
in matters of slavery.2 36
Elsewhere, Taney seems to have been even more concerned with
maintaining slavery than with bolstering the doctrine of states' rights. When
Congress included a provision in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 to prevent
states from using personal liberty laws to harbor fugitives against slave
catchers, Taney, writing on behalf of the majority, upheld the federal law. 37
The decision is an anomaly, in all likelihood because by narrowing the
scope of state autonomy Taney increased slave owners' recapture rights.2 38
In part, the indication from the contrasting approaches in Dred Scott and
Ableman is that the importance of property ownership in slaves could trump
any opposing individual interests. Yet, Taney's insistence in Dred Scott that
the country give its "respect to the State sovereignties"'239 in their several
decisions to stigmatize blacks was central to his denial of nationally
recognized black citizenship. Thus, the federal government could not trump
states' policies in safeguarding property interests.
Taney's proslavery decisions, especially Dred Scott, faced the concerted
opposition of the Republican Party.24 ° The historian Alfred Brophy has
235. See Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property:
The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 707
(2000) (discussing Dred Scott in the context of the states' rights doctrine).
236. See 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 93-94 (1850) (holding that every state has a right to
determine the slave status of individuals without federal intervention).
237. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 524-26 (1858); accord Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 631 (1842) (Taney, J.,concurring) (indicating that the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 required states' "cordial co-operation" in the recapture of fugitive
slaves).
238. Tony A. Freyer, A PrecariousPath: The Bill of Rights After 200 Years, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 757, 773 (1994).
239. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416.
240. Abraham Lincoln, for instance, rejected that Dred Scott had any binding effect upon
the political decision-making of the President or Congress. See Hadley Arkes, On the Moral
Standing of the President as an Interpreter of the Constitution: Some Reflections on Our
Current "Crises", 20 PS SUMMER 637, 640-41 (1987); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial
Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 88 (1998); Mark A. Graber, Popular
Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. 923, 941-42 (2006). Lincoln walked a political tight rope, neither wanting to be
seen as a supporter of the opinion nor as an opponent of judicial interpretive supremacy. He
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explained that Lincoln believed Dred Scott required free states to accept
slavery within their borders: Taney's decision led to the conclusion that "the
Constitution 'expressly affirms slavery' according to Taney; [and] because
of the supremacy clause, nothing in the Constitution or laws of a state can
destroy a right expressly affirmed in the Constitution. Therefore, the right to
cannot be abridged by any state or by the United States
property in a slave
24
Constitution.,

1

With the outbreak of the Civil War, Republicans gained control of all
three branches of government and found the occasion to overturn Dred
Scott by constitutional amendment. 242 The next section shows that while the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments aimed to supersede states' plenary
power in matters of civil rights, subsequent judicial decisions reestablished
significant aspects of antebellum federalism.
IV. RECONSTRUCTION PROGRESS

The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments emerged from efforts to
overturn Dred Scott and to add a clear provision to the Constitution
providing federal authority to act on matters of liberty and equality. 243 The
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified to immediately abolish slavery,
something that before the Civil War was unfathomable to all but the most
ultimately settled on claiming that Dred Scott was not binding on any but the immediate
controversy involved in that case. See Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, First
at
available
(transcript
1861)
4,
(Mar.
Address
Inaugural
http://209.10.134.179/124/pres3l.html). Another Republic leader, William H. Seward, who
went on to be Secretary of State, ardently expressed his party's disagreement with the
substantive part of Dred Scott, calling for a reorganization of the Court to make certain that it
would abide by the Constitution. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1 st Sess. 941 (1858); J. G. de
Roulhac Hamilton, Lincoln's Election an Immediate Menace to Slavery in the States?, 37 AM.
HIST. REV. 700, 702 (1932).
241. Alfred L. Brophy, Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon the Constitution: FederalState Relations in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 221 (1990).
242. See Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in
the Era of the FourteenthAmendment, 24 HOUS. LREV. 221, 227 (1987).
243. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 157 (2d ed. 1969) (explaining
abolitionist thought relative to Thirteenth Amendment); Alexander Tsesis, Reconstruction
Abolitionism, in PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ABOLITIONISM AND ITS
CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Alexander Tsesis ed., Columbia University Press, forthcoming
2008) (discussing Thirteenth Amendment abolitionism); Lucinda M. Finley, Putting
"Protection" Back in the Equal Protection Clause: Lessons from Nineteenth Century Women's
Rights Activists' Understandings of Equality, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 429, 436
(2004) (elaborating on how abolitionist thought on the Declaration of Independence became
part of the Fourteenth Amendment). For a more detailed discussion, see generally HAROLD M.
HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

1835-1875 (1982); WIECEK, supra note 225.
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radical of abolitionists. The Amendment's second section granted Congress
the power to end any practices that legislators found to be rationally related
to any remaining vestiges of involuntary servitude. 2' The Fourteenth
Amendment secured the privileges and immunities of citizenship with the
interlinking prohibition against any state actions that infringed on due
process and the equal protection of law. 245 The Fourteenth Amendment's
fifth section also provided Congress with a new authority to protect the
rights of its citizens, 246 thereby changing the very federalist foundation of
the American Constitution and rendering Dred Scott obsolete. It granted the
federal government the authority to enact protections for fundamental
rights, to allocate funds for their protection, and to grant federal courts
powers to adjudicate alleged infringements on substantive rights.2 47 These

two Amendments altered the dynamic between state and federal
248 During congressional debates Representatives and Senators
governments. 24
spoke of them as providing the federal government with the authority
244. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440
(1968) ("Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation.").
245. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
246. See id. § 5.
247. See Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can't Take It with You:
ConstitutionalConsequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 857
(2005) (discussing how the primacy of national citizenship of the Fourteenth Amendment
overruled Dred Scott); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress's Power to Enforce Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 187, 263 (2005) ("[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment .. .understood the
Fourteenth Amendment, at a minimum, as a delegation to Congress of the plenary power to
define and enforce in the federal courts the substantive rights of U.S. citizens that they had just
exercised in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866."); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 353 (2006) (arguing that under the Fourteenth
Amendment "fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as a free man
and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent
upon his citizenship of any State"); Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The
Declarationof Independence, Bill of Rights and FourteenthAmendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361,
363 (1993) (relating how the Fourteenth Amendment "united [the Declaration of Independence]
with the Constitution in the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the Declaration of Independence") (emphasis added); Robin West,
Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to Reva Siegel, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1465,
1478 n.40 (2006) (asserting that "the U.S. Congress has an obligation under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment" to ensure states uphold the "duty to protect all citizens' natural
rights"). For a perspective indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment was not a radical break
from traditional federalism, see EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 30 (1990); Maltz, supra note 242, at 278-79 (siding with a narrow
interpretation of Reconstruction statutes and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment).
248. TSESIS, supra note 15.
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needed to safeguard the founding principles of the Declaration of
Independence and Preamble to the Constitution. 249
The constitutional fruits of Reconstruction's civil rights revolution aimed
to alter the federalism of Dred Scott and to empower Congress to provide
protections against private and state infringements. As in the days of Chief
Justice Taney, who challenged the notion of congressional power to prevent
slavery in the territories, the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court denied the
constitutionality of some of the most important legislative efforts to assert
national primacy in the realm of fundamental human rights.25°
249. Space does not allow for an exhaustive treatment of this point, but there are many
representative statements indicating the Revolutionary foundations of both Amendments. For
example, Schuyler Colfax, the Speaker of the House for the Thirty-Ninth Congress, opened the
session, in 1865 soon after the Amendment was ratified, with a statement on Congress's power:
[l]t is yours to mature and enact legislation which ... shall establish [state
governments] anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will guaranty all
necessary safeguards to the people, and afford, what our Magna Carta, the
Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of governmentprotection to all men in their inalienable rights.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1865). The same year Representative Godlove S. Orth
expected the Thirteenth Amendment to be "a practical application of that self-evident truth, 'that
all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights;
that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."' CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d
Sess. 142 (1865); see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (1865) (statement of Sen.
James S. Rollins).
After the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, Senator Lyman Trumbull explained that
"the liberty to which every citizen is entitled; that is the liberty which was intended to be
secured by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States originally,
and more especially by the amendment which has recently been adopted." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). Iowa Representative James F. Wilson avowed that "citizens of the
United States, as such, are entitled to certain rights; and ... being entitled to those rights it is the
duty of the Government to protect citizens in the perfect enjoyment of them. The citizen is
entitled to life, liberty, and the right to property." Id. at 1294. Wilson stood for national rights
while continuing to maintain that states must retain their police power. Id. Colfax made the most
revealing statement of all about Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
[I]t is the Declaration of Independence placed immutably and forever in
our Constitution. What does the Declaration of Independence say? . . . It
says that all men are created equal [quoting]. That's the paramount object
of government, to secure the right of all men to their equality before the
law. So said our fathers at the beginning of the Revolution. So say their
sons to-day, in this Constitutional Amendment .... It declares that every
person-every man, every woman, every child, born under our flag, or
naturalized under our laws, shall have a birthright in this land of ours.
Charles Fairman, The Original Understanding: Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 73 (1949).
250. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 884-99 (1986). But see MICHAEL LES
BENEDICT, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2006) ("[M]ost Republicans did not want to
displace state and local governments as primary protectors of the ordinary rights of their
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But following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment the prospects
looked good for the advocates of nationally recognized civil rights. With the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,5 Congress showed its willingness
to pass laws for protecting rights at the core of American citizenship. The
Act secured the right to "make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property. 25 2 The statute further provided citizens with the "full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property

.

. .

any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the

contrary notwithstanding. 253 It prohibited public and private acts of
discrimination. 4 Federal courts were authorized to exercise original
jurisdiction over cases, but state courts could also hear causes of action
arising under the Act. 55 Litigants could remove cases from state to federal
courts if state laws infringed on their federal rights. 256 Even state officials
who violated the Act could be criminally prosecuted. 257 All violators could
be imprisoned for up to a year and fined no more than $1,000.258 States
retained concurrent authority to pass civil rights laws.25 9 The sweeping
nature of these provisions showed the intent of those who enacted the
Reconstruction Amendments to federalize civil rights protections, which
had previously been solely at the states' discretion.
The Act's criminal provisions similarly were predicated on a radical
revision of civil rights federalism. States retained exclusive jurisdiction over
private conduct, involving civil, criminal, and transactional matter, but the
federal government now asserted its jurisdiction to regulate matters
affecting nationally recognized fundamental rights. 260 That meant states
could enact varying tort, penal, and contract laws, but they could not
exclude an entire class of persons from their protections. By itself, even
before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, that was a clear break
from the Dred Scott construct of federalism.

citizens ..... Republicans framed the most limited Reconstruction they could and still secure
meaningful freedom in the South.").
251. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
252. Id. § 1.
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. Id. § 3.
256. Id.
257. See id. § 2.
258. Id.
259. Id. § 3.
260. Id.
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During debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Lyman Trumbull, explained that the statute was
meant to secure the Declaration of Independence's promises of life, liberty,
and property. 26 ' This was especially critical for African Americans who had
been "ground down and degraded" by slavery.262 Congress passed the law
less than a year after Chief Justice Taney's death, demonstrating a decisive
unwillingness to accept his racialized notions of rights. Just as
consequential was the signal that Congress could now interpret the
Constitution and determine what rights are essential to citizenship. As
Trumbull put it, the Thirteenth Amendment "vests Congress with the
discretion of selecting that 'appropriate legislation'
which it is believed will
2 63
slavery.9
prevent
and
end
the
best accomplish
Senator George H. Williams noted that there was no need to include a
citizenship clause in the statute because its protections would implicitly
confer civil rights protections on everyone residing in the states and
territories. 2 ' Trumbull looked to Justice Bushrod Washington's circuit court
dicta in Corfield v. Coryel1265 to deduce the extent of congressional authority
under the Thirteenth Amendment.266 Washington's nonexhaustive list of
privileges of citizenship included "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind; and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the
Government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole... ,
[t]he right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other
State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
otherwise.' ' 267 The Reconstruction Congress surmised that under the
Thirteenth Amendment's Section Two it had the authority to provide for
these and other essentials of citizenship, even if they were not enumerated
in the Bill of Rights.268
The key players who supported the Civil Rights Act expected to use
Corfield as a starting point for establishing what civil rights Congress was
261. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
262. Id. at 475.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 572.
265. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
266. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866).
267. Id. at 475.
268. See MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 80-83 (1986) (discussing the
constitutional authority Congress relied on to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Michael Kent
Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House
Cases Without Exhuming Lochner, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 32 n.122 (1996) (citing primary sources
on congressional authority to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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empowered to protect now that it was no longer burdened by Dred Scott's
states oriented federalism. As Trumbull put it, the proposed law made it
clear "that all persons in the United States shall be entitled to the same civil
rights., 26 9 Its only object "is to secure equal rights to all the citizens of the
country," by protecting "a white man just as much as a black man. 27 °
Representative James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
and the bill's floor manager, defined civil rights as "the natural rights of
man; and those are the rights which this bill proposes to protect every
citizen to enjoy. ' 27 ' These statements indicated a newfound sense of
authority of Congress to affirmatively act on interests, such as property
ownership, which Taney had found to be at the sole discretion of the states.
The Thirteenth Amendment, the wellspring of congressional power to pass
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, had changed the dynamic between state and
federal authority. To Trumbull this power shift was clear: "Congress is
bound to see that freedom is in fact secured to every person throughout the
land,' 272 pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment authority. Everyone "must
be fully protected in all his rights of person and property; and any
legislation or any public sentiment which deprived any human being in the
land of those great rights of liberty will be in defiance of the Constitution;
and if the states and local authorities, by legislation or otherwise, deny those
rights, it is incumbent on us to see that they are secured., 273 The Act's
supporters did not, by any means, expect that changes to the Constitution
would remove ordinary criminal and civil cases, which did not involve
infringements of civil rights, from the exclusive realm of state
sovereignty.274
The Act of 1866 was to be only the beginning of Reconstruction. Its
terms were so limited because Republicans needed a supermajority to pass
the measure over President Andrew Johnson's April veto. 275 Republicans
269. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866).
270. Id.
271. Id.at 1117.
272. Id. at 77.
273. Id.
274. See Kaczorowski, supra note 247, at 187, 210-12.
275. The congressional vote overriding Johnson's veto isfound at CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1809 (Senate), 1861 (House) (1866). The urging of Secretary of State Seward
and Ohio Governor Jacob D. Cox, both Republicans who supported Johnson against attacks
from those in their own party, made no difference in Johnson's decision to break with
congressional reconstruction. Inhis lengthy message explaining the veto, Johnson said that the
rights enumerated inthe Act were the province of each state and that itwas unconstitutional to
grant such extensive jurisdiction to the federal courts. Letter from Jacob D. Cox to Andrew
Johnson (Mar.22, 1866), in 10 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON 287 (Paul H. Bergeron et al.
eds., 1992). The note from Seward isfiled under date of March 27, 1866 inANDREW JOHNSON
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shortly decided that the ambiguities inherent in the enormous power to end
all incidents and badges of involuntary servitude made further constitutional
clarification necessary. The year Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act, it
began debating the merits of an additional amendment.
In May 1866, Congress started its debate on the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was meant, in significant part, to
constitutionalize the federal authority over citizenship rights codified in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.276 Members of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on
Reconstruction, like Thaddeus Stevens, John A. Bingham, William P.
Fessenden, and Jacob M. Howard, wanted to extend national power over
civil rights beyond the protections that were enumerated by the Act. 277 Their
aim was to clarify the grant of congressional enforcement authority in the
Thirteenth Amendment by adding nationally applicable equal protection,
due process, and privileges and immunities clauses to the Constitution.
The Committee incorporated phrases into their drafts that reflected
unmistakably abolitionist sounding rhetoric. Like the Declaration of
Independence, the Fourteenth Amendment forced the nation to examine its
practices against an ideal government that protected individual rights to
increase overall welfare. Inclusion of the Citizenship Clause seemed to
foreclose any future judicial decision that tied citizenship rights to any
particular race. The terms of the Amendment's first section were broad
enough to provide for the federal protection of natural rights of all
American citizens. Through the process of appellate reevaluation, later
judges in the twentieth and twentieth-first centuries would interpret the "due
process" and "equal protection" clauses to cover the rights of women,278
racial minorities,27 9 disabled persons,280 and gays.28'
An opponent of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative Samuel J.
Randall, warned that "[t]he first section proposes to make an equality in
every respect between the two races, notwithstanding the policy of
discrimination which has heretofore been exclusively exercised by the
PAPERS Reel 21 and at the Library of Congress; 6 ANDREW JOHNSON, COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 405 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).

276. See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the FirstAmendment: Congress, Section 5,
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1584-85 (1995). For a
couple of examples of statements connecting the Fourteenth Amendment with the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866) (statement of Representative
Eliot) and id. at 2462 (statement of Representative Garfield).
277. See Bybee, supra note 276.
278. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
279. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
280. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
281. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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,,282

States.
Randall was in fact correct in the extent to which the Fourteenth
Amendment would alter the constitutional vision of Dred Scott. There was
no discussion during the debates of disempowering states of the day-to-day
workings of its citizens' rights; rather, the framers wanted to prevent any
unjust infringements against nationally recognized civil rights. As
Representative Frederick E. Woodbridge of Vermont put it, Congress would
henceforth have the power to "enact those laws which [would] give to a
citizen of the283United States the natural rights which necessarily pertain to
citizenship."

V. POST-RECONSTRUCTION JUDICIARY

The first judicial interpretations of Reconstruction laws recognized that
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments had eliminated the stateoriented civil rights federalism of Dred Scott. Designated circuit court
justice Noah Swayne upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 in United States v. Rhodes.284 Swayne found that the Thirteenth
Amendment enabled Congress to pass civil rights legislation and to grant
federal courts jurisdiction to adjudicate cases arising under it. 285 That
amendment, he found, "trenches directly upon the power of the states and of
the people of the states. 2 86 Even though the final version of the Act did not
include the term "citizen," Swayne thought Congress had meant to confer
that status to all "free inhabitants born within the United States or
naturalized under the laws of Congress. 28 7 Until the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment, rights varied "in different localities and according
to circumstances. 2 8 8
Other decisions, such as In re Turner,289 which struck down the
Maryland apprenticeship statute, also drew away from Dred Scott's state
290
oriented federalism, adopting a more national notion of civil rights policy.
Chief Justice Chase, writing as a designated circuit court justice, found that
following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment "[c]olored persons
equally with white persons are citizens of the United States., 2 9' The
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530 (1866).
Id. at 1088.
27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No 16,151).
Id. at 787.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789 (quoting I Kent, Comm. 292).
Id. at 790.
24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C. Md. 1867) (No. 15,210).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 340.
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Amendment made legislators primarily responsible for carrying out its
principles: "Congress is itself the judge of its power to pass such a law, and
is alone the judge of the existing necessity for it. '2 92 Six years later, in
United States v. Given,293 with Justice Strong also sitting as a circuit justice,
a Delaware district court held that the Reconstruction Amendments
"enlarged the powers of congress" by securing "to persons certain rights
which they had not previously possessed., 294 He noted that "prior to the
recent amendments" congressional legislation could not be used to protect
all personal rights in the Constitution; "[b]ut the recent amendments have
introduced great changes., 295 Reconstruction had not only extended the
notion of rights to a universal principle often discussed during the
revolutionary period,296 it also increased federal legislative power to protect
them.
Not only were the rights given-the right of liberty, the right of
citizenship, and the right to participate with others in voting, on
equal terms, without any discrimination on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude-but power was
expressly conferred upon [C]ongress to enforce the articles
conferring the right.297
The potential of a socially conscious use of federal powers was
significantly diminished by the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of
the Reconstruction Amendments. In the Slaughter-House Cases298 of 1872,
butchers challenged a Louisiana law giving a company an exclusive license
to operate a slaughterhouse in the New Orleans area.29 9 Other than persons
who made up the corporation, all other butchers had to pay a fee to use the
facility. 0 0 Those butchers who were not part of the company filed a cause of
action in a Louisiana state court. 30 ' Eventually the matter reached the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that the exclusive license was a
legitimate public health regulation, not an unlawful restraint on the
butchers' trade.30 2 The Association eventually challenged the statute in the
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 339.
25 F. Cas. 1324 (C.C.D. Del. 1873) (No. 15,210).
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326.
See supra Part II.
Given, 25 F. Cas. at 1326.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 57.
State ex rel. Belden v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545, 554 (1870).
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United States District Court for Louisiana, where the case was heard by
Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley and District Judge William B.
Woods.

°3

The opinion, issued under Bradley's name, found that Louisiana

had misused its police power to "confer on the defendant corporation a
monopoly of a very odious character. ' '304 The post-Reconstruction
Constitution demanded "that the privileges and immunities of all citizens
. ..be absolutely unabridged [and] unimpaired" by local sensibilities.3 °5
States were prohibited from using unreasonable regulations to infringe on
the benefits of national citizenship. And "one of the privileges of every
American citizen" was "to adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuitnot injurious to the community-as he may see fit."303076 That privilege was
"nothing more nor less than the sacred right of labor.,

When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, John A. Campbell
represented the dealers and butchers. 308 During the Civil War, Campbell had
resigned from the Supreme Court and served as the Confederate Assistant
Secretary of War.309 Curiously, Republican Senator Matthew H. Carpenter

represented the monopoly. 3'0 That same Supreme Court term Carpenter
argued for a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment challenging
Illinois's ban against licensing women to be lawyers.3 1 Justice Samuel F.
Miller wrote the majority opinion in that case, joined by four other Justices,
holding that women could not demand
to enter occupations of their choice
3 12
privilege.
national
a
of
basis
the
on
Justice Miller's Slaughter-House decision is best known for its
distinction between the privileges and immunities of state citizenship and

303. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co. 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
304. Id. at 653.
305. Id. at 652.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. ROBERT SAUNDERS, JR., JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, SOUTHERN MODERATE, 18111889, at 214 (1997).
309. See id. at 136, 154; see also Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 633 (1994); William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities"
Seriously: A Call To Expand the Constitutional Canon: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 178 (2002).
310. Aynes, supranote 309, at 633.
311. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 133-37 (1873). For a fascinating
discussion on Chief Justice Chase's decision to dissent without opinion in that case, see Richard
L. Aynes, Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice Chase's Dissent and the "Sphere of Women's
Work", 59 LA. L. REV. 521, 527-30, 537 (1999).
312. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 137-39.
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United States citizenship.3" 3 The only national privileges Miller
acknowledged were those already enumerated in the Constitution and
identified by a Supreme Court precedent, such as the right to travel to
Washington, D.C., the right of protection on the high seas, and habeas
corpus protections. 1 4 Miller implied that unenumerated rights could not be
redressed in federal courts. 1 5 Contrary to Trumbull's assertions, Miller
understood Justice Washington's interpretation of the privileges and
immunities of Article IV, in Corfield, to correspond to "rights belonging to
the individual as a citizen of a [s]tate.

316

The Amendment, Miller wrote,

never meant "to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights"
from state to federal governments.3"7 The Court evidently conceived of
itself, and the Reconstruction Amendments, as having a very limited role in
redressing state violations of individual rights.
Miller also rejected the butchers' Thirteenth Amendment argument,
finding its focus on the incidents of involuntary servitude inapplicable to a
matter that was primarily about the exploitation of property rather than
persons.31 8 The Court, therefore, upheld the Louisiana monopoly; of more
grave consequence, it engrafted a weak interpretation of citizenship rights
onto the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
While Justice Miller acknowledged that the first Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott's holding on African
American citizenship,3 9 his interpretation made state sovereignty a trump
against federal review of even those state laws that detrimentally affected
any inalienable rights. The notion that there is a distinction "between
citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State 32° incorporated a

313. During debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller supported a conservative
alternative to it, which was supported by President Andrew Johnson, that might have fueled his
weak interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Slaughter-House. See Aynes,
supra note 309, at 660 & n.228 ("The fact that this alternative Fourteenth Amendment was seen
as a conservative proposal orchestrated by President Johnson and that it was specifically
rejected in favor of Bingham's more potent formulation, demonstrates that Miller's interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment was wrong."). Two of the other four justices joining Miller's
majority, repeatedly demonstrated opposition to emancipation from slavery. See id. at 665-68.
314. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
315. See id.
316. Id. at 76. Miller actually misquoted Corfield; rather than "citizens of the several states"
the original case has "citizens in the several states." The original is more open to a national
perspective of privileges and immunities. See Kevin C. Newsom, Setting Incorporationism
Straight:A Reinterpretationof the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 653-54 (2000).
317. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S (16 Wall.) at 77.
318. Id. at 66-74.
319. Id. at 73.
320. Id. at 73.
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pivotal presumption of Dred Scott into post-Reconstruction jurisprudence.3 2'
The Court showed an unwillingness to budge from the established order of
federal sovereignty that had left states free to violate civil rights without
being subject to any federal intervention.
The continuing use of racial violence, segregation, and employment and
property discrimination in the South made blacks the greatest losers in
Slaughter-House even though the case had nothing directly to do with them.
The power to secure civil rights returned, in great part, to Southern
governments which were increasingly being "redeemed" from Republican
control. The prospect of equal citizenship was dealt a staggering blow, even
though at first glance the opinion seemed to be of minor consequence to any
issue other than government created monopolies.
Four out of nine Justices dissented from Miller's opinion.32 2 Two
separate dissents are relevant here. Justice Swayne argued against rolling
back jurisprudence to antebellum state federalism, viewing the
Reconstruction Amendments as "a new departure" because they reduced
state power. 12 Justice Bradley, in his dissent, focused on the Reconstruction
Amendments' effect on individuals' relationship to their communities. The
Fourteenth Amendment, Bradley argued, had made United States
citizenship "primary," enabling the federal government to step in if a state
or local power "denied full equality before the law" to any classes of
persons.3 24 Both of these dissents implied that the Fourteenth Amendment
not only overruled Dred Scott on national citizenship but also enabled the
federal government to act against civil fights violations.
The judicial retreat from Reconstruction became increasingly ossified in
1876. United States v. Cruikshank325 relegated the prevention of criminal
violence, even when motivated by racial hatred, to state authorities.3 6 Just
as in the civil realm, which the Slaughter-House Cases involved, the court
allowed state sensibilities to trump federal concerns for the welfare of
American citizens.
Cruikshank began chugging its way to the Supreme Court at a time when
the Grant Administration's Justice Department began scaling back civil

321. See J. OWENS SMITH ET AL., BLACKS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 65 (1987).
322. Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 11 (Field, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 125 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 112, 113-16 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
325. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
326. Id. at 554-55; see also Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get Therefrom Here?: How the
Law Still Threatens King's Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1, 12-13 (2004); Bezalel Stem, Comment,
Huck Finn and the Civil Rights Cases: A Case Study in Supreme Court Influence, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 79, 109 (2006).
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rights enforcement.3 27 The case concerned 1873 terrorism perpetrated
against blacks who were holding a political rally. 328 The event came to be
known as the Colfax Massacre. 329 A white mob converged on a courthouse
that blacks had taken over. 33 0 The mob then set the building ablaze and shot
at anyone emerging from it. Over 100 black men and two white men lost
their lives during the mayhem.33 '
Federal prosecutors secured 100 indictments under the First Enforcement
Act, but they could only get three convictions for the massacre, and the
Supreme Court, in Cruikshank, overturned even those.3 32 Chief Justice

Waite, writing for the majority, avoided any substantive decision on the
case by dismissing all charges because of facial deficiencies in the
complaints.333 While the Court recognized the existence of a national right
to peaceful assembly, 334 it refused to extend the reach of the Fourteenth

Amendment to privately perpetrated racist violence.335 According to Waite,
then, states had retained a large degree of the latitude that they had at the
time of Dred Scott to decide whether redress was appropriate for racially
instigated crimes.

327. On Grant administration prosecutions of the Ku Klux Klan, see ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 457 (1988); Lou
FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA Ku KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871-1872 (1996);
Stephen Cresswell, Enforcing the Enforcement Acts: The Department of Justice in Northern
Mississippi, 1870-1890, 53 J. S. HiST. 421, 425 (1987); Michael E. Deutsch, The Improper Use
of the Federal GrandJury: An Instrumentfor the Internment of PoliticalActivists, 75 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1159, 1170 n.56 (1984); Herbert Shapiro, The Ku Klux Klan During
Reconstruction: The South Carolina Episode, 49 J. NEGRO HIST. 34, 45-46 (1964); Everette
Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-1877, 28 J. S. HIST. 202, 217-18 (1962).
328. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 175 (1985).
329. FONER, supra note 327, at 530-31.
330. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 328, at 175.
331. FONER, supra note 327, at 530-31; KACZOROWSKI, supra note 328, at 176; David
Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a "Negative
Citizenship" Regime, 21 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 15 n. 51 (1996).
332. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559-61 (1875) (Clifford, J., concurring and
dissenting).
333. Waite found the indictments incomplete because they merely said that the defendants
violated victims' civil rights rather than enumerating those rights. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 55154 (majority opinion).
334. Id. at 552-53.
335. Id. at 554 ("The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, but it adds nothing to the rights of one
citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment
by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of
society.").
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An even bigger reversal of Reconstruction took place in the Civil Rights
Cases. 336 They arose from the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of
1875. 3 The Act was the ultimate statute passed by the Reconstruction
Congress.338 Its full name was "An act to protect all citizens in their civil
and legal rights. 3 39 The first section entitled "all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States" to "the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public
conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
34
amusement., 34 0 Its second section provided criminal and civil penalties.
Violators were subject both to private causes of action and to criminal
prosecutions.342 The third section gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over cases arising under the Act,343 and the fourth section prohibited state
and federal jury selection to be predicated on race.3 " Seemingly, the Act
was making certain that there was an equality of rights irrespective of state
prejudices. It clearly broke away from Dred Scott, prohibiting public places
from excluding persons based on race from the equal enjoyment of their
facilities .34
The Court heard challenges to the first two sections of the Act.346 By
1883, when the claims made their way into the Supreme Court,
336. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
337. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-4, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
338. See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1998) (discussing the debate about Reconstruction that arose in passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1875). Concerning Charles Sumner's heroic effort to secure passage of the Act,
see JAMES M.

MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE

NAACP 16, 19-21 (2d ed. 1995). Even on his death bed, in March 1874, Sumner did not forget
that abolition, via the Thirteenth Amendment, meant more than merely setting free millions of
people who had been denied an education by Southern slave codes and were still excluded from
numerous public places. As he lay on his death bed, Sumner was not remiss to remind a visitor,
"You must take care of the civil-rights bill, . . don't let it fail." ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY
OF RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1877, at 226 (1990). Sumner died in March of 1874 and did not live
to see the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Id. Benjamin Butler, who managed the bill
in the House, committed himself to defending "the rights of these men who have given their
blood for me and my country." Id. On the role of President Ulysses Grant in the controversy,
see WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE, ULYSSES S. GRANT: POLITICIAN 368-71(Frederick Ungar
Publishing Co. 1957) (1935).
339. Civil Rights Act of 1875 §§ 1-4.
340. Id. § 1.
341. Id. § 2.
342. Id.
343. Id. § 3.
344. Id. § 4.
345. Id. § 1.
346. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Reconstruction had come to a standstill even though blacks were still
deprived of the equal emoluments of national citizenship. Sharecropping,
segregation, peonage, and the convict lease system disproportionately
harmed blacks, relegating them to second class citizenship in many states.347
The Civil Rights Cases decided five consolidated causes of action that
dealt with various public accommodations discriminations in California,
Kansas, Missouri, New York, and Tennessee.3 4 s Four cases arose from
criminal prosecutions: two defendants allegedly denied black patrons access
to an inn or hotel, the third refused to grant a black person entry into the
theater dress circle of the popular Maguire's Opera House in San Francisco,
and the fourth denied "another person, whose color is not stated, the full
enjoyment of the accommodations" to the newly opened "Grand Opera
House in New York., 349 A married couple brought the fifth case against a
railroad company for denying the wife access to the ladies' car because "she
was a person of African descent. "350
As Part VI discusses, the Court's decision on the Fourteenth Amendment
continues to undercut legislative effectiveness in the area of civil rights. The
Civil Rights Cases held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens
only against state interference with their rights, but "[i]ndividual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment., 35' The federal
legislature was not given the authority to pass "general legislation upon the
rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation; that is, such as may be
necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the states may adopt or

347. One author recently found that in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, perhaps as many
as one-third of all sharecropping farmers "were being held against their will in 1900."
JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA'S UNDERCLASSES FROM CIVIL WAR TO THE

PRESENT

107 (1992). On the convict lease system, see

SLAVERY

(1996),

DAVID OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN

ALEx LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996), and KARIN A. SHAPIRO, A NEW
SOUTH REBELLION: THE BATTLE AGAINST CONVICT LABOR IN THE TENNESSEE COAL FIELDS,

1871-1896 (1998).
348. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4.
349. Id.; see also James Madison,
San
Francisco
Theatrical
Memories,
http://www.sfmuseum.org/hist/theatres.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2007) (concerning Maguire's
Opera
House);
Grand
Opera
House,
Grand
History:
In
the
Beginning,
http://www.grandoperahouse.org/aboutushistory/history.html
(last visited Nov. 29, 2007)
(history of Grand Opera House).
350. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4-5.
351. Id. at 11 ("It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and
broader scope."); see also id. at 19 ("This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct; it
takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to inns, public
conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces state legislation on the same
subject, or only allows it permissive force.").
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enforce. 352 That went a long way to setting the clock back to Dred Scott,
placing private discriminations at the behest of states. The Court decided
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress authority to
recognize, target, and prevent social discriminations, such as exclusion from
public places of amusement and segregation on public carriers.353 It found
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional because it provided
penalties for behavior that was unconnected to adverse state action.354 The
Court refused to defer to Congress's finding that the enjoyment of equal
public accommodations was an essential right of citizens.355 Bradley
similarly refused to concede that Congress was competent in finding that
such discrimination was a badge or incident of involuntary servitude.356
Eight other justices joined Bradley's opinion. The sole dissenter was
Justice John Marshall Harlan.3 57 From his perspective, the Fourteenth
Amendment's fifth section enabled Congress to enact "appropriate
legislation . . and such legislation may be of a direct and primary
character, operating upon states, their officers and agents, and also upon, at
least, such individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and
wield power and authority under the state. 358 Just as Dred Scott had
"overruled the action of two generations," so too the majority's
undercutting of Congress "made a new departure in the workings of the
federal government. 3 59 The Court's notion that the Reconstruction
Amendments did not grant Congress the authority to act at "its own
discretion, and independently of the action or non-action of the states" went
against their very purpose.36 ° They authorized "legislation of a primary and
direct character, for the security of rights created by the national
constitution., 36' Returning to issues of the Slaughter-House Cases, Harlan
referred to "the obligation to protect the fundamental privileges and
immunities granted by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to citizens residing in
the several states. 36 2 To hold otherwise undermined "the foundations upon
which the national supremacy has always securely rested. 3 6 3 Even if the
352. Id.at 13-14.
353. Id. at 19.
354. Id.at 18-19.
355. Id. at 19.
356. Id. at 24.
357. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
358. Id.at 36.
359. Id. at 57.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.

HeinOnline -- 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 1227 2007

1228

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

state action doctrine were correct, segregation by "railroad corporations,
keepers of inns, and managers of places of public amusement," all of whom
were implicated by the Act of 1875, rendered them answerable to the public
since they were subject to state regulation." 64 To rule otherwise left the
victims of discrimination at the3 6mercy
of corporations and individuals
5
wielding state-regulated authority.
After the decision was rendered, a newspaper columnist wrote that "it is
safe to say that no other decision of the court since the famous Dred Scott
decision .
. has created so much excitement and discussion. '366 In
November 1883, journalist John E. Bruce asserted that the Civil Rights
Cases had affirmed Dred Scott.367 Both cases struck federal laws-first the
Missouri Compromise and later the Civil Rights Act of 1875-that had
established national anti-discrimination principles. Methodologically, both
cases relied on a literalist textual interpretation, and a narrow approach of
original intent, that forbade federal legislators from securing fundamental
moral standards against unjustifiable infringement. State sovereignty over
private acts of discrimination wound up a more important constitutional
principle than the protection of elementary human interests. The Court
made clear its readiness to thwart statutory initiatives against state and
private discrimination, thereby contributing to the continued complacency
with a racially binary America, somewhat like the one that existed in 1857
when Dred Scott was decided. The federal government then left the growth
of Jim Crow laws unimpeded, until 1954, when the Court began to undo
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education36 8 and Congress followed suit
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.369 Less than half a month after the Civil
Rights Cases decision was announced, the Governor of Texas asked rail
companies to separate black and white passengers.37 °
Despite the vociferous criticism that has been leveled at the Civil Rights
Cases for undoing a human rights statute that might have ended segregation
in 1875, the Court still follows its state action doctrine. 37' The precedent has
364. Id. at 59.
365. Id.
366. THE STEVENS POINT JOURNAL (Stevens Point, WI), Oct. 27, 1883, at 2.
367. See Marianne L. Engelman Lado, A Question of Justice: African-American Legal
Perspectives on the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L.'REV. 1123, 1165-66 (1995).
368. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
369. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
370. Norman J. Colman, COLMAN'S RURAL WORLD, Nov. 1, 1883, at 4.
371. See Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled
Neutrality Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 1333-34 (2003) (stating that the current
Court continues to follow the Civil Rights Cases holding on the restraints of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).
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so crippled the legislative branch's ability to pass principled laws against
arbitrary discrimination that the vast majority of civil rights initiatives
during the twentieth-century, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have been
predicated on the Commerce Clause's grant of regulatory authority over the
national economy.3 7' From the beginning this has presented an odd
mismatch between the anti-discrimination moral imperatives and economic
regulatory authority. My claim is that the Court's notion that Congress may
only act responsively under the Fourteenth Amendment confuses the
legislative and judicial functions: there does not have to be a controversy to
address before Congress can respond to it with a statute. 373 The Court's
responsive reading of congressional powers has much in common with the
doctrines of standing and ripeness, but not the typical policymaking of a
legislature which is meant to identify, balance, and specify governmental
policy for the protection of individual rights for the general welfare.
VI. CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS

The Civil Rights Cases undercut federal efforts to end civil rights
violations until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. So harmful an
effect might have been expected to fade with a greater sensitivity to
minority rights. To the contrary, the state action requirement continues to
obstruct federal civil rights initiatives. Recently, the Court has continued to
372. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 252-53 (1964). My point is in the same vein as Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Heart of
Atlanta. He agreed with the majority that Congress had legitimately relied on Commerce Clause
authority, but he wrote separately to emphasize that the "primary purpose of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 . . . is the vindication of human dignity and not mere economics." Id. at 291
(Goldberg, J., concurring). In his opinion, Congress's authority to pass the Civil Rights Act of
1964 derives both from Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 292. Justice Douglas, in a separate concurrence, was likewise reluctant to rest the opinion
entirely on commerce authority since the "right of persons to move freely from State to State
occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of
cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines." Id. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
373. The initial recognition of this judicial scrutiny derives from footnote four of Carolene
Products. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). At the core of
Stone's footnote lay the American tradition, often breached by self-interest though it was, of
protecting minorities against the whims of powerful majorities. "[P]rejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. That statement was the fulcrum for
future elevated scrutiny cases that probed into whether individuals were unfairly treated for
being members of an identifiable group.
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rely on post-Reconstruction precedents to strike statutes seemingly dealing
with core national rights. Dred Scott has long been in disrepute, but the
Civil Rights Cases have taken its place as the precedent for denying
Congress's power to act affirmatively to secure the citizenry's civil rights.
City of Boerne v. Flores37 4 signaled the Court's unwillingness to
effectuate the framers' intent, and the necessity, for the Fourteenth
Amendment to alter the dynamic between federal and state power as to civil
rights. The holding of the case was that Congress had "exceeded" its
Section 5 authority in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA").37 5 The Act was a major piece of civil rights legislation meant to
protect the free exercise of religion from state infringement. 376 Congress
passed it by an overwhelming bipartisan majority in response to a Supreme
Court holding that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the
Free Exercise Clause, even if they limit an individual's ability to participate
in an established religious ritual.3 7 7 The RFRA imposed a strict scrutiny
standard on any substantial burden of religious practices. 378 Boerne
departed from, or at least narrowly construed, Katzenbach v. Morgan's
statement that "[Section] 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is a positive
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 79 Instead of relying on that Civil Rights
Era case, Boerne gave its stamp of approval to the 1883 Civil Rights Cases,
which had prevented Congress from ending segregation. 38 Likewise,
381 which had found that Congress
Boerne drew on United States v. Harris,
exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power when it passed a
section of the Ku Klux Klan Act. 38' That law had punished private violence
"without reference to the laws of the states, or their administration by the
officers of the state." 383 The premise that the Boerne Court extracted from
these cases was that congressional enforcement through its Fourteenth
384
Amendment Section 5 power can only be remedial but not interpretive.
374. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
375. Id. at 536.
376. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000).
377. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
378. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
379. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
380. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-25.
381. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
382. Id. at 640.
383. Id.
384. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 ('The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the
remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause.").
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Under this standard, only laws that are congruent and proportional for
remedying unconstitutional state behavior can survive judicial scrutiny. 385
The erosion of legislative authority to identify a fundamental right, such
as freedom of religion under the RFRA, and to pass a law to protect it, was
also evident in United States v. Morrison.3 86 In that case, the Court held that

Congress had overstepped its Section 5 authority by providing a civil
remedy under the Violence Against Women Act.3 87 That case, like Boerne,
also predicated its responsive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
on Harris and the Civil Rights Cases for the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment only applies to state conduct, but not to private action.38 8 The
Court even found one of the greatest travesties of justice, Cruikshank,3 89 to
be relevant.39° Cases that had squeezed the federal government out of any
serious role in protecting the fundamental rights for which the government
of the United States was formed in the first place also became key to the
Rehnquist Court's federalism legacy. Jurisprudence that had derailed
congressional Reconstruction now unhinged legislative efforts to end
gender-based violence.
The Court then applied this same constraint on civil rights authority to
strike a provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
that required state compliance. 39 This time, in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, it found that the Eleventh Amendment renders states immune from
complying with national standards of decency in the workplace.3 92 Concerns
about federal overreaching actually elevated states' prerogatives above the
interests of ordinary citizens who might have relied on the law to get redress
for employment age discrimination. The majority rejected the predicate that
the federal government's plenary role in preventing workplace
discrimination trumps state violations of the ADEA. 393 Although Kimel was
by no means as egregious as Dred Scott, both cases were excessively
deferential to states' sovereign prerogatives.3 94 That the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment had changed the dynamic between states and the
federal governments was seemingly inconsequential to the Court's
regressive federalism. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the federal
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 520, 530, 532.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 621-23.
See supra text accompanying notes 325-35.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
See id. at 72-73.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 78; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416 (1856).
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government can prohibit private and public acts of discrimination in the
labor market.3 95 Kimel denied that Congress may identify a national
3 96
standard against age discrimination on which all state employees can rely.
In a similar vein, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garret3 97 invalidated the applicability of Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act... to state officials.3 99 Like Kimel, Garrett denied that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment enabled Congress to create a cause
of action for redressing allegations of state employment discrimination.4 0
Congress was thereby judicially restricted from ending discrimination
despite the extensive evidence, cited to by the dissent, of state
discriminatory conduct against disabled employees.40 ' In both cases, the
majority applied nothing more than a rational basis of scrutiny to examine
whether states had been engaged in unconstitutional discrimination meriting
a congressional remedy.40 2 Drawing from Boerne, the Court decided that
"[t]he legislative record of the ADA... simply fails to show that Congress
did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment
against the disabled. 40 3 The taint of state rights trumping core values
against discrimination harked back to a similarly skewed priority of
federalism in Dred Scott. The Court showed itself to be unwilling to let
Congress decide priorities for protecting vulnerable persons, even when
there was no hint of majoritarian abuse.
Unexpectedly to many who thought that civil rights precedents were
generally threatened by this old-time version of federalism, the Court
qualified its earlier holdings. Hence in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs,4 4 the Court upheld the Family Medical Leave Act's
private cause of action against the states.40 5 The Court made clear that it was
deferring to Congress because the statute aimed to redress violations of the
Equal Protection guarantee against gender discrimination.4 6 Then came
Tennessee v. Lane,4 °7 which upheld Title II of the ADA's provision for
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
(2000).
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Id. at 64 (majority opinion).
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
Garrett,531 U.S. at 374-76.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 389-424 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Id. at 366 (majority opinion); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83-84
Garrett,531 U.S. at 368.
538 U.S. 721 (2003).
Id. at 740.
Id. at 736.
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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private damages arising from discrimination in access to county
courthouses. 4 ' The Court invoked a standard of review approaching strict
scrutiny because the fundamental right to access to the courts was
involved.4 °9
The Fourteenth Amendment's scrutiny differentiations based on the
plaintiffs group status, served to draw the Court away from the legal abyss
that could have led it to nullify much civil rights legislation on the basis of
state sovereign immunity. The difficulty with Hibbs and Lane is that their
decisional fulcrum was the responsive reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment from the Civil Rights Cases,4 1 ° which continues to hamper
Congress from independently identifying core American rights and passing
laws to protect them. That is, even though Hibbs and Lane came to
favorable conclusions on behalf of two pieces of civil rights legislation they
did not shed the notion that, at least in circumstances where rational basis of
review is relevant as it was in Kimel and Garrett, state concerns can
continue to trump nationally recognized rights. Hibbs and Lane provided
some guidance for Congress, indicating that to pass constitutional muster it
can protect only rights the court has recognized to be important or
fundamental. Those cases, however, remain only weakly supportive of the
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 grant of congressional authority, which
should be on an equal footing with the Court in deciding which rights are
fundamental to American citizenship.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Dred Scott's protection of slave property is a moribund relic of the past,
but to some extent its state-oriented federalism persists to the present day.
Cases like Boerne, Garrett,and Kimel continue to show too much deference
to states in matters as fundamental to the people as the freedom of religion
and the freedom from discrimination in the workplace. The Court's
regressive federalism only countenances responsive congressional action.
That constitutional perspective disregards how, by overturning Dred Scott,
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments granted Congress the power to

408. Id. at 533-34.
409. Id. at 529 ("Title II [of the ADA] is aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic
rights, including the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, that call for a standard of
judicial review at least as searching, and in some cases more searching, than the standard that
applies to sex-based classifications."); id. at 522-23 (stating that the federal statute enforced "a
variety of . . . basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more
searching judicial review").
410. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736; Lane, 541 U.S. at 529.
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secure fundamental interests, making it a coequal branch in determining
how to protect life, liberty, and happiness.
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provide Congress with the authority necessary for evaluating,
determining, and furthering the common weal by laws narrowly tailored for
safeguarding the inalienable rights of its citizens. Those Amendments
significantly altered the relationship between the legislative and judicial
branches. The implication of my claim is that federalism in its postReconstruction formulation provides the Court with the capacity to find
unconstitutional a civil rights statute that infringes on other constitutional
411
rights. For instance, if a federal statute that facilitates the right to travel
unjustifiably abridges the freedom of speech,412 then the Court can readily
find it unconstitutional. What the change in governmental structure,
resulting from the Reconstruction Amendments, prohibits is for the Court to
second-guess Congress in its assessment and determination of what legal
means to use to provide for the equal protection of fundamental rights.
Legislators need not wait for justices to give them guidance on what is
essential to the nation's citizens. Contrary to the Court's recent assertion
that Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment is only remedial
and not substantive, 41 3 the historical record indicates that the Reconstruction
Amendments enable Congress along with the Court to define rights
essential to citizenship. The change to the interplay between the judicial and
legislative branches was meant to prevent another Dred Scott and made the
Civil Rights Cases an example of judicial overreaching, both of which
second-guessed legislative decisions to protect civil rights.
Congressional ability to provide meaningful safeguards for civil rights
extends beyond the explicit provisions of the Bill of Rights. It includes
those interests that are central to the nation's normative purpose, as it is set
out in the Preamble to the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence. Recent decisions have drawn from the post-Reconstruction
411. The Supreme Court has located the right to travel in a variety of constitutional clauses.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965), found the right to travel in the Fifth Amendment;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908), located the right in the Fourteenth Amendment;
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1966), found it in the Commerce Clause's
protection of free movement; and both Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999), and Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868), found that it derived from the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2.
412. Free speech is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
413. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517, 518-19 (1997) (determining that the
phrase "appropriate legislation" in section 5 means that Congress can only pass remedial
legislation which "deters or remedies constitutional violations," but does not allow Congress to
create constitutional rights).
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cases, like Harris and the Civil Rights Cases, to erode congressional civil
rights authority. At the heart of the problem is a persistent judicial tendency,
which dates back to Dred Scott and should have ended with the
Reconstruction Amendments, to limit Congress's role in protecting interests
that are at the core of national citizenship.
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